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Article 3

ONLINE TERMS AS IN TERROREM DEVICES
COLIN P. MARKS *
ABSTRACT
Online shopping has quickly replaced the brick-and-mortar experience for a large portion of the consuming public. The online
transaction itself is rote: browse items, add them to your cart, and
check out. Somewhere along the way, the consumer is likely made
aware of (or at least exposed to) the merchant’s terms and conditions, via either a link or a pop-up box. Such terms and conditions
have become so ubiquitous that most consumers would be hardpressed to find a merchant that doesn’t try to impose them somewhere on their website. Though such terms and conditions are
pervasive, most consumers do not bother to read them before
checking out. Consumers might be surprised by what they would
find if they did read the terms and conditions, as many retailers
include clauses limiting liability, disclaiming warranties as well as
choice of law, forum selection, arbitration, jury waiver, and class
action waiver clauses. Many of these clauses are grounded in a
practical concern over limiting liability and lowering transaction
costs. However, the fact that retailers do not include such clauses
as part of their in-store transactions raises the question of whether
the retailers are actually concerned with binding consumers to
such terms. The apparent lack of importance of these terms is further highlighted by the fact that most retailers use “browsewrap”
terms and conditions to bind their customers, despite browsewrap
being one of the least effective methods of making consumers
aware of the terms. While these terms and conditions may provide
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some utility to the companies attempting to impose them, the main
benefit may in fact be their in terrorem effect. This is especially
true in instances where companies have failed to adequately notify
their consumers about the terms’ existence. This Article will examine the various methods that are used in online contracting to
bind consumers and consider the enforceability of the most common terms. The Article will conclude that the primary incentive
sellers have to include such terms on their websites is their in terrorem effect. Though the use of online terms and conditions as in
terrorem devices may be appealing economically, the use of
browsewrap as the primary notification device ex ante presents
moral and ethical issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online shopping has quickly replaced the brick-and-mortar experience
for a large portion of the consuming public. The online transaction itself is
rote: browse items, add them to your cart, and check out. Somewhere along
the way, the consumer is likely made aware of (or at least exposed to) the
merchant’s terms and conditions, via either a link or a pop-up box. Such
terms and conditions have become so ubiquitous that most consumers would
be hard-pressed to find a merchant that doesn’t try to impose them somewhere on their website. Though such terms and conditions are pervasive,
most consumers do not bother to read them before checking out. 1
Consumers might be surprised by what they would find if they did read
the terms and conditions. Based on a recent empirical review of the largest
retailers’ websites, I found that ninety-four percent had a clause limiting liability and eighty-five percent had clauses disclaiming warranties. 2 Other
common clauses were choice of law (eighty-one percent), forum selection
(fifty-seven percent), arbitration (thirty-five percent), jury waiver (thirty-four

1. See Tracy D. Gunter, Can We Trust Consumers with Their Brains? Popular Cognitive
Neuroscience, Brain Images, Self-Help and the Consumer, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 483 (2014)
(discussing the cognitive dissonance of consumers and the neuroscience behind marketing tactics);
Cheryl B. Preston, “Please Note: You Have Waived Everything”: Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts?, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 538–40 (2015) (recognizing the reality that consumers do not stop
to read the terms in online transactions); cf. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 588 (2007) (noting consumers are concerned with information privacy, yet don’t read the policies discussing how their
information will be used); James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
1, 11 (2005) (showing that less than one percent of study participants noticed privacy policies on
websites).
2. See Colin P. Marks, Online and “As Is”, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2017).
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percent), and class action waiver (thirty-four percent). 3 In other words, retailers are taking advantage of online transactions by attaching additional
terms and conditions that a consumer would not normally find in-store. 4
Many of these clauses are grounded in a practical concern over limiting
liability and lowering transaction costs. 5 However, the fact that retailers do
not include such clauses as part of their in-store transactions raises the question: Are retailers actually concerned with binding consumers to such terms?
The apparent lack of importance of these terms is further highlighted by the
fact that most retailers use “browsewrap” terms and conditions to bind their
customers, despite browsewrap being one of the least effective methods of
making consumers aware of the terms. 6 In this vein, some commentators
have criticized the use of such online terms as failing to elicit true consent.7
This Article will examine the effect online terms and conditions have on consumers, specifically with regard to the sale of goods.
While these terms and conditions may provide some utility to the companies attempting to impose them, the main benefit may in fact be their in
terrorem effect. 8 This is especially true in instances where companies have
failed to adequately notify their consumers about the terms’ existence. 9 Part
II of this Article will examine the various methods used in online contracting
to bind consumers. It will conclude that while most retailers are using the
browsewrap method, this is a rational choice given the retailers’ main goal—
to make a sale. However, given the ability to choose a more effective method
of notice, the very choice of browsewrap represents a conscious tradeoff
made by the online sellers to choose expediency over effectiveness.
As not all retailers’ terms and conditions will fail for lack of adequate
notice, Part III explores the effectiveness of these clauses, differentiating between personal injury plaintiffs and those suffering pure economic harm. It
concludes that even if online terms and conditions survive an attack based on
notice, in many scenarios, clauses such as warranty and liability disclaimers

3. Id. at 39.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Section II.C.
6. See infra Section II.B.
7. For a discussion on mandatory disclosure and the negative effects on consumers, see generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647 (2011) (discussing the evolution of mandated disclosure and how the prolific nature of
boilerplate language in contracts has negatively affected consumer choice and eviscerated mutual
consent).
8. Merriam-Webster defines in terrorem as “by way of threat or intimidation: serving or intended to threaten or intimidate” and gives as an example: “overbroad covenants not to compete
which have in terrorem effect on employees.” In Terrorem, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/in%20terrorem (last visited Dec. 21, 2018) (citing well-known contracts
scholars J. D. Calamari and J. M. Perillo).
9. See infra notes 23–43 and accompanying text.
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will not be effective. 10 Building on the conclusions found in Parts II and III,
Part IV reflects upon the effect such clauses have on consumers and concludes that the primary incentive sellers have to include such terms on their
websites is their in terrorem effect. The retailer can later use these clauses
as a means of deterring consumers from bringing suit based on the misperception that they are bound by such terms. 11 Use of online terms and conditions as in terrorem devices may be appealing economically, but such use
presents moral and ethical issues.
II. BINDING CONSUMERS IN AN ONLINE WORLD
A. Why Do Retailers Attempt to Bind Consumers?
Before exploring the enforceability of online terms and conditions, it is
useful to first pause and consider what a typical retailer would do in response
to a lawsuit absent such terms and conditions. For many retailers, a defective
product has nothing to do with their interaction with the product. In other
words, the defective product was defective when they received it, and the true
party at fault is the manufacturer. The Uniform Commercial Code
(“U.C.C.”) provides that in such a situation, the retailer can “vouch-in” the
manufacturer under Section 2-607(5). 12
This provision gives the manufacturer a chance to defend the suit directly or risk being bound by the finding of liability in a subsequent suit by
the retailer. 13 Alternatively, the retailer may implead the manufacturer under
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra notes 203–208 and accompanying text.
12. This Section provides:
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which his
seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the seller
may come in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any
action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend
he is so bound.
U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018).
13. See Smith Radio Commc’ns, Inc. v. Challenger Equip., Ltd., 527 P.2d 711, 712–13 (Or.
1974) (demonstrating the use of U.C.C. § 2-607(5) by a retailer for indemnification against a manufacturer when the manufacturer refuses to participate in the defense). A suit against the retailer,
rather than against the manufacturer, may be due to a lack of vertical privity between the buyer and
the upstream manufacturer. See Conn. Pie Co. v. Lynch, 57 F.2d 447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (requiring privity for warranty claims); Mouzon v. Radiancy, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d. 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2016)
(“[P]rivity of contract is required between a plaintiff and a defendant to state a warranty claim.”);
All W. Elecs., Inc. v. M–B–W, Inc., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (restating the
California requirement for privity in warranty claims); Lexow & Jenkins, P.C. v. Hertz Commercial
Leasing Corp., 122 A.D.2d 25, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“It is now settled that no implied warranty
will extend from a manufacturer to a remote purchaser not in privity with the manufacturer where
only economic loss and not personal injury is alleged.”). However, many states permit direct suits
against manufacturers when personal injuries are involved. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Ford Motor Co.,
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Federal Civil Procedure Rule 14 or its state equivalent. 14 In either case, from
the retailer’s perspective, the real party at fault—the manufacturer—is made
to answer for its defective product. In this sense, clauses disclaiming warranties and limiting damages do nothing more than divert the injured consumer to the correct defendant.
Furthermore, even if the retailer is in some way to blame for a defect in
a sold good, online terms and conditions may lower transaction costs by narrowing the class of claims. Disclaimers of warranties, and limitations on
remedies, provide predictability as to potential liability. 15 Other clauses, such
as arbitration clauses, class action waivers, and choice of law clauses, similarly provide predictability and potential cost savings. 16
The notion that such clauses provide predictability and savings presumes that such clauses are binding. As explored in Part III, the effectiveness
of such clauses may depend, among other things, on the type of injury sustained. A plaintiff that has sustained injuries to person or property is much
more likely to be able to circumvent “as-is” clauses (both in contract and tort)
than a plaintiff who has suffered only economic harm. 17 Furthermore, the
method by which an online seller makes its consumers aware of its terms may
affect their subsequent enforceability.

462 F. Supp. 2d 296, 309 (D. Conn. 2006) (“[T]he Connecticut Supreme Court held that, ‘[w]here
the liability is fundamentally founded on tort rather than contract there appears no sound reason
why the manufacturer should escape liability simply because the injured user, a party in the normal
chain of distribution, was not in contractual privity with it by purchase and sale.’” (quoting Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189, 192 (Conn. 1965))); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba
Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 322 (D. Md. 1983) (“The General Assembly of Maryland, by subsequent
legislation, virtually eliminated the requirement of privity in actions for damages for personal injury
grounded on breach of an express or an implied warranty.”).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004 (West
2015) (permitting the designation of a responsible third party defendant); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 428.70 (West 2016) (permitting claims against third party defendants); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1007
(McKinney 2016) (regulating when a third party may be designated by a defendant). Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 14(a)(1) provides:
A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a
nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it. But the thirdparty plaintiff must, by motion, obtain the court’s leave if it files the third-party complaint
more than 14 days after serving its original answer.
FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1).
15. See infra Section III.B.
16. See infra Section III.A.
17. Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a Contract-Based Products Liability
Regime, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 206 n.201 (1998) (listing cases in which the court refused to uphold
a warranty waiver in favor of a consumer who had suffered personal injury or property damage);
William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Effect of UCC § 2-316(2) Providing That
Implied Warranty Disclaimer Must Be “Conspicuous”, 73 A.L.R.3d § 2[a], at 256 (1976) (“[T]he
courts themselves have recognized that where a product defect normally covered by implied warranties causes personal injury or property damage for which recovery is permitted under the doctrine
of strict liability in tort, even a conspicuously printed disclaimer of implied warranties may be ineffective to preclude such recovery.”).
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B. Multitude of “Wrap” Agreements
It is a hallmark of contract law that, in order for a contract to be binding,
the parties must be aware that the contract terms exist.18 This awareness, of
course, does not mean that the parties have read, or even understood the
terms, but merely that they have been presented with the terms in a fair and
forthright manner. 19 In the real world, as opposed to the online world, this is
accomplished when the parties receive the actual contract.20 The contract
may be long, complicated, and full of dense provisions, but so long as the
parties are made aware of the contract, they will be bound to the terms they
agreed upon. 21 Thus, the parties have a duty to read the terms and are presumed, under an objective test, to have agreed to all of the terms whether they
have read them or not. 22

18. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30–32 (applying a reasonably prudent offeree standard); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage
in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that
he assents.”); Id. § 33(1) (“Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as
an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain.”).
19. See James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A contract need not
be read to be effective; people who accept take the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove
unwelcome.” (quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996))); Caspi v.
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 531–33 (N.J. 1999) (applying a “fair and forthright”
standard of notice to a forum selection clause); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Acceptance of an offer is a manifestation of assent to the terms thereof
made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.”).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 30 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
21. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing Assent”
as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 469, 476 (2008) (“[I]f a party objectively manifests assent to be bound to a contract (for example, by signing a written contract document), a court will almost automatically find assent to all
terms contained in the writing.”). See generally John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing
Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974) (discussing the traditional contract rule that parties have
a duty to read contracts).
22. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2003) (“If the non-drafting party indicates his general assent to the
form, courts will enforce the terms contained therein whether or not that party approves of the terms
provided, understands those terms, [or] has read them . . . .”). Some consumers are made aware of
the terms after the initial purchase. Under a “rolling contracts” approach, these later terms are
viewed as the offer. Under such an approach, “the vendor or seller is the master of its offer and can
choose to invite acceptance by conduct, such as by using the product. This view of contract formation is limited by the caveat that the buyer must be given an opportunity to review and reject the
offer, but otherwise, such contracts are enforceable.” COLIN P. MARKS & JEREMY KIDD,
MASTERING SALES 50 (2018). Courts adopting a rolling contract approach view this as sufficient
to bind the consumers to the terms and conditions. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147,
1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If they constitute the parties’ contract because the Hills had an opportunity
to return the computer after reading them, then all must be enforced.”); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at
1452 (“A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the
acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.”). Not all courts adopt such an approach. See
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In online contracts, there are no physical contracts handed to the other
party, and so efforts must be made by the online retailer, through their website design, to make users aware of the existence of terms and conditions. A
review of the case law reveals that four primary methods of binding consumers have emerged: browsewrap, sign-in wrap, clickwrap, and scrollwrap
agreements. I add to this list what I term “bannerwrap” agreements, which
are an emerging variation of browsewrap agreements. Each type of agreement is described below as well as the relative enforceability of each.
In a browsewrap agreement, “the website will contain a notice that—by
merely using the services of, obtaining information from, or initiating applications within the website—the user is agreeing to and is bound by the site’s
terms of service.” 23 It is not unusual for browsewrap agreements to be nothing more than an inconspicuous link at the bottom of a webpage and to be
passive in nature, in that there is no need to click separately to continue with
a purchase. 24 A primary problem with browsewrap, however, is that the links
are not always easy to find, subjecting them to attack for failing to give consumers fair notice of their existence.
This difficulty in finding the browsewrap link is exacerbated when it is
submerged on the page below the portion of the screen that is viewable during
purchase, effectively permitting the user to continue with the transaction
without ever becoming aware of the terms’ existence. Such was the case in
Specht v. Netscape Communications 25—an oft-cited example of how a website’s design can fail to put a reasonable consumer on inquiry notice. 26 In
Specht, the plaintiffs downloaded “free” software from Netscape’s website,
which transmitted private information about the plaintiffs to Netscape. 27
When the plaintiffs sued for violations of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act 28 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 Netscape moved to
compel arbitration. 30 The arbitration provision was part of the terms in the
license agreement, which appeared on the webpage from which the plaintiffs

Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340–41 (D. Kan. 2000). But courts, even those
that do adopt this approach, require that the recipient of the later terms be put on fair notice of their
existence and be informed about how to reject the terms. See Defontes v. Dell, 984 A.2d 1061,
1071 (R.I. 2009).
23. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
24. See Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (delineating the nature
of browsewrap by calling it “passive”); see also Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 548 (2014) (defining browsewrap as allowing “buyers to purchase without seeing a prominent hyperlink to the underlying terms”).
25. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id. at 20–21.
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1367, 2521, 2701–2711, 3117, 3121–3127 (2012).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
30. Specht, 306 F.3d at 20–21.
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downloaded the software. 31 However, the license was not located near the
“download” button on the visible screen, but rather it was visible only if the
plaintiffs had scrolled down the webpage. 32
In resolving the case, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the submerged
terms were not binding. 33 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed, 34 finding that a “reasonably prudent offeree”
would not be put on constructive notice of the license’s terms due to the submerged nature of the hyperlink on the webpage. 35 With regard to the submerged terms, the court noted:
[T]here is no reason to assume that viewers will scroll down to
subsequent screens simply because screens are there. When products are “free” and users are invited to download them in the absence of reasonably conspicuous notice that they are about to bind
themselves to contract terms, the transactional circumstances cannot be fully analogized to those in the paper world of arm’s-length
bargaining. 36
Though submerged browsewrap terms present clear problems, even
viewable browsewrap terms have been held unenforceable when the hyperlinks were “inconspicuous” 37 or failed to put the consumer on notice that the
purchase was subject to the terms and conditions. 38 For instance, in Ngyuen
v. Barnes & Noble, 39 a consumer sought to avoid arbitration of his claims
against Barnes & Noble based on its failure to give proper notice of the website’s terms and conditions, which were located in a hyperlink in the viewable
31. Id. at 25.
32. Id. at 23–25.
33. Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
34. Specht, 306 F.3d at 40.
35. Id. at 30.
36. Id. at 32.
37. Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (describing the browsewrap terms at issue in the case as “simply too inconspicuous to meet [the Specht]
standard”); Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (calling attention to
prominence as a requirement to put consumers on notice of browsewrap terms and conditions and
listing numerous cases on both district and appellate levels holding such terms are invalid if they
are inconspicuous). In fact, the Ninth Circuit even held that conspicuous hyperlinks may be unenforceable. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e
therefore hold that where a website makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on
every page of the website but otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any
affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons
users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.”).
38. See Lee v. Intelius Inc., 737 F.3d 1254, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding the trial court’s
denial of a request to compel arbitration because the defendant failed to provide adequate notice of
the arbitration clause to the consumer); Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (“For an internet browsewrap
contract to be binding, consumers must have reasonable notice of a company’s ‘terms of use’ and
exhibit ‘unambiguous assent’ to those terms.” (quoting Specht, 306 F.3d at 35)).
39. 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
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portion of the screen. 40 Citing Specht, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit noted that “where, as here, there is no evidence that the
website user had actual knowledge of the agreement, the validity of the
browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.” 41 The court went on
to hold that the terms were unenforceable despite the fact that the website
made its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of
the website in close proximity to the checkout buttons. 42 The court stated
that because the website “provides no notice to users nor prompts them to
take any affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the
hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.” 43
Perhaps in response to the enforceability problems facing browsewrap
agreements, some online merchants began using “sign-in wrap” agreements
as a method of binding consumers. Sign-in wrap agreements are defined as
instances where the website purposely notifies a user “of the existence and
applicability of the site’s ‘terms of use’ when proceeding through the website’s sign-in or login process.” 44 This type of agreement can itself be broken
down into two types. The first involves situations where a user creates an
account to shop on the website and agrees to the site’s terms of use when
creating the account; the user later reaffirms such assent by signing in to the
account to shop. 45 Perhaps the most famous example of this type of agreement is used by Amazon, which requires consumers to create an account that
they sign in to before shopping. 46 The second type does not necessarily require the creation and signing in to an account, but merely contains an
acknowledgement that by continuing through the checkout process, the user
agrees to the website’s terms and conditions. 47
In the first type of sign-in wrap agreement, in which an account is created and signed in to for purchasing, if the terms and conditions are only

40. Id. at 1173–75.
41. Id. at 1177 (citing Specht, 306 F.3d at 30–31).
42. Id. at 1178–79.
43. Id. at 1179.
44. Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 399.
45. Id. at 401; see also Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934,
at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016) (“‘Sign-in-wrap’ agreements are those in which a user signs up to use
an internet product or service, and the signup screen states that acceptance of a separate agreement
is required before the user can access the service. While a link to the separate agreement is provided,
users are not required to indicate that they have read the agreement’s terms before signing up.”).
46. See generally AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). See also
Conditions of Use, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201909000 (last updated May 21, 2018).
47. Starke v. Gilt Groupe, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5497 (LLS), 2014 WL 1652225, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 24, 2014); Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 904, 908, 912 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
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made available through an inconspicuous link at the bottom of the sign-in
page, then the page design is not much different from a browsewrap. However, the problems associated with typical browsewrap can be avoided if,
when the account is created, the existence of the terms is made clear—such
as by having the user click an “I agree” box to proceed. 48 But if the terms
are simply made available somewhere on the account creation page, 49 then
such agreements may face the same challenges that browsewrap terms face. 50
This is also true of the second type of sign-in wrap agreement that typically
is nothing more than an acknowledgement somewhere near the checkout button and a link to the terms. 51
Additionally, some websites have resorted to a banner flashing across
the screen displaying the terms, presumably to avoid arguments that the website did not clearly present the online terms and conditions. These banners
appear at the bottom or top of the viewable page or are on display across the
middle of the page, obscuring the content of the website. These bannerwrap
agreements (as I am labeling them) are relatively new but appear to simply

48. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176–79 (9th Cir. 2014).
49. See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *6 (D.
Mass. July 11, 2016), rev’d, 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018) (“In a sign-in wrap, a user is presented with
a button or link to view terms of use. It is usually not necessary to view the terms of use in order to
use the web service . . . .”).
50. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It is standard
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes
a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the taking constitutes an
acceptance of the terms, which accordingly become binding on the offeree.”); Mark E. Budnitz,
Consumers Surfing for Sales in Cyberspace: What Constitutes Acceptance and What Legal Terms
and Conditions Bind the Consumer?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 741, 751 (2000) (“The fact that online
shopping takes place under different circumstances becomes important because the Restatement
requires that the consumer ‘intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know’ the
seller may infer from that conduct that the consumer assents. The consumer may not realize that
clicking on the ‘submit’ button has the effect of finalizing the transaction by constituting her acceptance.”). But see Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (indicating
the forum selection clause may be enforced if the hyperlinked terms and conditions appear next to
the only button to move forward).
51. Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Whether there was notice
of the existence of additional contract terms presented on a webpage depends heavily on whether
the design and content of that webpage rendered the existence of terms reasonably conspicuous.”);
see also Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177–78 (holding that placement of the “Terms of Use” hyperlink in
the bottom left-hand corner of every page on the website, and in close proximity to the buttons a
user must click on to complete a purchase was not enough to put a reasonably prudent user on
inquiry notice of the terms of the contract); Budnitz, supra note 50, at 751 (“The consumer may not
realize that clicking on the ‘submit’ button has the effect of finalizing the transaction by constituting
her acceptance. She may believe that, in legal terms, she is merely being invited to make an offer
and that clicking on the button simply means that she is submitting her order form for the seller’s
review; if approved, she believes the seller will make an offer to which she is not obligated to accept.”). But see Starke, 2014 WL 1652225, at *3 (holding the arbitration clause was binding as the
terms were hyperlinked next to the “Shop Now” button).
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be a variation of the browsewrap agreement with the added benefit of never
being submerged. 52
With the exception of account-creation sign-in wrap agreements that involve checking a box, the common theme with the above forms of agreements is that they are passive in nature. A user can proceed with a purchase
without having to take any affirmative steps to manifest assent or click any
icons other than those they were already going to use to make a purchase. In
contrast, the remaining two categories of “wrap” agreements—clickwrap and
scrollwrap—require users to take affirmative steps above and beyond the
simple checkout process.
Clickwrap agreements typically come in the form of a box users must
check before proceeding. 53 Thus, clickwrap agreements necessitate an active
role by the user of a website. 54 By checking the box, users agree that they
have read the terms and conditions and are bound by them, which at the very
least puts users on inquiry notice of the terms’ existence. 55
Scrollwrap agreements take the extra step of making the user view the
terms and conditions, such as through a pop-up box appearing on the website.
Typically, the scrollwrap forces the user to view the terms and conditions as
part of the website’s construction and design with a method of assenting at
the end, such as an “I agree” button that must be clicked to proceed. 56 As
clickwraps and scrollwraps both require an active step by the consumer, they
are generally viewed as more enforceable than browsewrap agreements.57
52. See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 236–37 (finding the fact there was a banner with terms and conditions in smaller font at the top of the website was unconvincing and that reasonable minds could
disagree on the reasonableness of notice).
53. See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (clearly defining
clickwrap as requiring the consumer to utilize a checkbox indicating assent).
54. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Clickwrap agreements
require a user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the
website.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (highlighting
the activity requirement (that is, clicking a box) of the “clickwrap” designation and contending
“every court to consider the issue has held clickwrap licenses enforceable”).
55. See Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 397; Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (clarifying clickwrap
“requir[es] that the user manifest . . . assent to the terms” (quoting Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at
429)); Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 675, 690 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“Inquiry
notice exists where a person has knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent person
using ordinary care to make further inquiries. Where the person does not take those added steps, he
or she is chargeable with knowledge that would have been acquired through diligent inquiry.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (focusing on the “intent” and
“conduct” requirements of contractual assent).
56. Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 398.
57. Preston, supra note 1, at 544 (“Clickwrap agreements are the generally enforceable, standard form contracts that Internet users assent to merely by clicking an ‘I agree’ option.”); see also
Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. 2002) (“The contract is entered
into by the subscriber clicking an ‘Accept’ button below the scroll box . . . . Neither is the use of a
‘scroll box’ in the electronic version that displays only part of the Agreement at any one time inimical to the provision of adequate notice.”); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet
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C. The Rational Selection of Browsewrap
Given that clickwrap and scrollwrap agreements are generally viewed
as more enforceable than browsewrap, one would think that these would be
the preferred methods of notice for online merchants. However, in a recent
empirical review of the methods used by the top retailers of goods in the
United States, seventy-two percent used browsewrap, while four percent used
clickwrap and none used scrollwrap. 58 These findings are consistent with an
earlier 2008 study of 500 online sellers (not limited to goods), which found
that eighty-eight percent used browsewrap.59 This inconsistency can be explained as a rational economic choice.
Just as with their brick-and-mortar counterparts, online sellers worry
that communicating additional terms and conditions to the buyer will discourage sales and lead to an inefficient use of time. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, in defending the use of rolling contracts, famously posited:
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone
for direct-sales operations . . . had to read the four-page statement
of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning
voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time.
And oral recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions (whether
true or feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that
they did not remember or understand it. 60
Though Judge Easterbrook was speaking to the advantage of providing
forms later, the concept is also relevant in online contracting. Forcing consumers to read through pages of terms will likely discourage sales, just as
requiring reading them in-person would. 61 Furthermore, plastering the website with large disclosures all over the first page could discourage sales, just
of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 873 n.200 (2016) (“Clickwrap agreements are also referred to as click-through agreements. Scrollwrap agreements are another type of clickwrap agreement.” (citations omitted)).
58. Marks, supra note 2, at 38. Additionally, twenty-four percent of retailers used sign-in
wrap. Id. “Bannerwrap” is a new term introduced in this Article and was not studied in the previous
article; however, I can confirm that no instances of bannerwraps were found in that study.
59. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 998 (2008). This study did not further delineate forms of assent
into sign-in wrap and scrollwrap, so it is therefore possible that some of the methods labeled as
browsewrap in that study could have qualified as sign-in wrap.
60. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
61. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of EStandard Terms Backfire, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 850 (2006) (“[I]ncreasing the information available to consumers, [including] the early display of terms[,] may add to the problem of information
overload. Further, without the immediacy of an actual transaction, consumers may find plowing
through legalese more tedious and worthless than ever.”); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text
Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 (1986) (discussing information overload: “Reading text one
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as large signs reading “ALL ITEMS SOLD AS IS—NO RETURNS” would
do in a brick-and-mortar store. 62
Another reason browsewrap agreements are preferred is expediency. 63
Websites are designed to get consumers from product selection to checkout
as quickly as possible. 64 At the heart of this design is a concern over lost
sales. 65 Any delay in the process, such as by a checkbox or pop-up screen
with lengthy contract language, may cause the consumer not to proceed with
the sale. 66 What is worse, the consumer may buy the same product elsewhere
from a competitor that uses browsewrap (and perhaps with identical terms
and conditions). 67 Rather than risk losing a sale through such a delay, online
sellers choose to use the form of wrap agreement that requires the least effort
from the consumer—browsewrap. 68
can’t understand is both extremely inefficient and emotionally frustrating. The consumer’s reaction
to the prospect of reading such text is therefore likely to be anxiety and avoidance.”); cf. William
N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with
the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV.
1083, 1133 (1984) (noting the argument that “Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures overwhelm consumers with complicated forms and too much information, thus discouraging them from shopping”);
Preston, supra note 1, at 574 (“The Internet-instant-gratification generation will come to see the
required action [of clicking through an e-contract] as a mere time-wasting hurdle slowing their access to the desired product or service.”).
62. Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web Sites and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263, 1283 (1998) (“[A] visitor to a traditional
store might well decline to purchase an item if the proprietor handed him a thick contract or prominently posted on one wall a large list of disclaimers . . . . By contrast, the owner of a Web site risks
alienating virtual visitors if she forces them first to view all of the legal information that a cautious
lawyer might recommend.”); cf. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 59, at 986 (“[R]etailers design
websites to balance the benefits of extracting purposeful assent with the burdens of complicating
the purchase process.”).
63. See Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 866−67 (2010) (describing how there is a “formalistic enforcement
of [browsewrap and clickwrap] contracts as necessary to promote market efficiency”).
64. Effross, supra note 62, at 1283 (“Site designers, who are commonly cautioned against including graphics that will extend the time required for their pages to be downloaded by a visitor,
are also aware that the potential purchaser might not spend the extra time to scroll or ‘click’ through
screens full of disclaimers or other pertinent terms.”); cf. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 863 (“Typical
consumers do not ask for or read their contracts pre-purchase, and companies have become accustomed to burying purchase terms in . . . Internet links.”).
65. See Effross, supra note 62, at 1283 (“[T]he owner of a Web site risks alienating virtual
visitors if she forces them to first view all of the legal information that a cautious lawyer might
recommend.”); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV.
1327, 1351 (2011) (“A business may lose customers if it asks them to sign contracts before processing relatively minor purchases.”).
66. Effross, supra note 62, at 1283; see Kim, supra note 65, at 1352 (suggesting online contracts with burdensome language may cause “the importance of the transaction” to be lost).
67. See Hillman, supra note 61, at 852 (describing how consumers shop rationally and prefer
convenience).
68. See Jeffrey H. Dasteel, Consumer Click Arbitration: A Review of Online Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 9 ARB. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017) (positing that “transaction simplification and speed
are at the root of the decision to employ browsewrap-type sites to sell products and services to
consumers”).
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At this point it is worth noting that online sellers are perfectly capable
of designing their websites to incorporate active, as opposed to passive, assent by consumers. 69 Therefore, the choice of browsewrap is a conscious
cost-benefit analysis on the part of the sellers. 70 Active forms of assent could
cost the sellers money, and—just as with similar choices made in brick-andmortar stores—online sellers are choosing the route that will not deter sales.71
This is a rational choice, but not one without consequences when a consumer
later seeks to avoid the enforcement of the terms and conditions. However,
as two commentators noted, “It seems that for the great majority of internet
retailers, the ease of the shopping experience is more important than concerns
about possible future liability.” 72
III. ENFORCING ONLINE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
This Article focuses on the prevalence of online terms and conditions in
the sale of goods, which are specifically governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. 73
As the U.C.C. includes specific provisions governing disclaimers of warranties and liability, special attention must be given to such clauses. Though
these two types of clauses are the most prevalent, many other terms and conditions, such as arbitration, forum selection, class action, and jury waiver
clauses, are also not uncommon. These latter types of clauses are frequently
used in conjunction and are not subject to any special rules under the U.C.C.
Therefore, a brief explanation of the enforceability of these lesser-used
clauses, followed by a discussion of express and implied warranties, applicable remedies, and limitations under the U.C.C., may be helpful in understanding the terms’ subsequent consumer impact.
A. General Enforceability of Online Terms and Conditions
As demonstrated in Part II, the enforceability of all terms and conditions
may be subject to the defense that the website design did not adequately provide notice of the terms’ existence. Beyond this general defense, many of

69. See Kim, supra note 65, at 1351 (“[W]ebsites have the capability to set-up how the contracting process will proceed . . . . Websites, in other words, make choices about how to present
contractual terms to the customer.”); Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 59, at 985 (emphasizing a
concern that internet retailers can restructure their websites to their benefit).
70. See Hillman, supra note 61, at 843–44 (“[B]usinesses can experiment with modes of
presentation, including methods of accessing the standard terms, graphics, and font sizes, to determine which presentations most effectively deter reading, and can use those strategies when the consumer decides to contract.”).
71. See id. at 843 (acknowledging businesses will draft terms in an effort to minimize standardterm shopping).
72. Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 59, at 1011.
73. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018) (“[T]his Article
applies to transactions in goods . . . .”).
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the clauses may be enforceable, subject to formation defenses, such as unconscionability. 74 Some states do prohibit class action and jury waivers, 75
but forum selection clauses and choice of law clauses generally survive. 76
Arbitration clauses are of special mention, as they are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 77 (“FAA”) and are consistently reaffirmed in Supreme
Court decisions. 78 Furthermore, these clauses frequently incorporate forum
selection clauses, class action, and jury waivers. 79 This is because the FAA
preempts those state laws that are not within the spirit of the national policy
favoring arbitration. 80
The Supreme Court stated that in passing the FAA, Congress intended
“to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . .

74. See infra Section III.E.2.
75. See In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (“The reality that the average
consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she
buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as
a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.”); Parsons v. Associated Banc-Corp, 881
N.W.2d 793, 803 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (invalidating a jury trial waiver because the court did not
believe the consumer “understood the enormous extent and scope of the rights he was giving up”),
rev’d, 863 N.W.2d 212 (Wis. 2017). See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
669, 676 (2001) (arguing that mandatory arbitration clauses equate to jury trial waivers and discussing the harm consumers face as a result).
76. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (upholding enforceability of a forum selection clause).
77. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012).
78. For a discussion on the history of the FAA and jurisprudence regarding the Act’s intent
and scope, see generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265
(2015).
79. Id. at 282 (“In addition to class action waivers, firms have regularly inserted . . . terms [including]: (1) truncated statutes of limitations, (2) damage limitations, (3) anti-injunction clauses, (4)
fee-shifting provisions, (5) forum-selection clauses, and (6) non-coordination agreements.”).
80. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626, 628
(1985) (“[A]s with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability. There is no reason to depart from these guidelines
where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights. Some
time ago this Court expressed ‘hope for [the Act’s] usefulness both in controversies based on statutes or on standards otherwise created’ . . . . By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” (quoting Wilke v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953))); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 480 n.2 (5th Cir.
2002) (“Under this modern reading of the FAA, the presumption of enforceability ‘is not diminished
when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.’” (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987))); Leslie, supra note 78, at 280
(“[A]rbitration agreements have become a safe harbor for otherwise unenforceable class action
waivers. Absent the judicial deference to the terms in arbitration agreements, class action waivers
would not be protected . . . .”).
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and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” 81 The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are open to traditional contract defenses, but the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld arbitration
provisions against traditional contract-based defense claims, such as unconscionability. 82 For instance, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 83 the
Court held that a class action waiver tied to an arbitration provision could not
be the basis for an unconscionability ruling. 84 The Court reaffirmed this position in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 85 declaring state laws prohibiting class
action waivers retroactively invalid under the FAA. 86
In light of Supreme Court precedent, it seems that the wise way to avoid
class actions would be to tie them to an arbitration provision. Interestingly,
though such clauses have been given such favorable status, they are still not
used by the majority of major online retailers. Only thirty-five percent of the
retailers studied used arbitration clauses in my 2017 study, which was up
from nine percent that used such clauses in a similar study of the top 500
online sellers reported in 2008. 87 Though arbitration clauses may be on the
rise, they are not the most common types of terms and conditions being
foisted upon consumers. The most common are warranty disclaimers and
damage limitations clauses. 88

81. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
82. See Rent-a-Ctr. W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 66, 71–72 (2010) (holding an employment
agreement that delegates to an arbitrator the “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to
the [Agreement’s] enforceability” is a valid delegation under the FAA).
83. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
84. Id. at 352.
85. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
86. Id. at 469.
87. Compare Marks, supra note 2, at 39, with Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 59, at 999.
88. Marks, supra note 2, at 38–39.
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B. U.C.C. Warranties
The three main warranties that may be implicated in online sales of
goods 89 are: express warranties, 90 implied warranties of merchantability, 91
and implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. 92 Express warranties are governed by U.C.C. Section 2-313(1), which provides that such warranties can be created by “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain” (“affirmation warranties”) or by “[a]ny description of the
goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain” (“description warranties”). 93
Affirmation warranties include any affirmative representations as to the
quality of the goods as well as warranties and guarantees. Section 2-313(2)
makes clear that the use of the words “warranty” and “guarantee” are not
necessary but retains the caveat that “an affirmation merely of the value of
the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.” 94 Description warranties

89. There is a fourth, the warranty of title and against infringement. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1),
(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018). This Section provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no knowledge.
....
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the
kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third
person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes specifications to the
seller must hold the seller harmless against any such claim which arises out of compliance
with the specifications.
Id. This Section is rarely at issue in the transactions examined in my study and is, therefore, not
addressed in this paper.
90. U.C.C. § 2-313.
91. Id. § 2-314.
92. Id. § 2-315.
93. Id. § 2-313 (1)(a), (b). There is a third kind of express warranty that is not typically relevant
to online transactions, though it could be. Section 2-313(1)(c) provides, “Any sample or model
which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model.” Id.
94. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
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include affirmative statements as to the type, 95 dimensions, 96 and specifications 97 of a particular good. Though both warranties require that the affirmation, description, or sample becomes the “basis of the bargain,” courts traditionally presume such and do not require plaintiff buyers to show that they
actually relied on the express warranty. 98
Under the U.C.C., implied warranties of merchantability also attach to
every sale of goods by a merchant seller. Section 2-314 provides a non-exclusive list of what it means to be merchantable:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any. 99
A suit for breach of this implied warranty requires a plaintiff to prove
both that the good is not merchantable, as defined in subsections (a) through
95. See Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147, 149–50 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding a breach of express warranty claim based on the defendant’s statement to the plaintiff that
a pig was of a certain type); R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838, 845
(N.D. Miss. 1977) (permitting claim for breach of express warranty where product did not conform
to seller’s description that product was “good, first-class permanent type of antifreeze”).
96. See Edward E. Gillen Co. v. City of Lake Forest, No. 91 C 183, 1991 WL 171945, at *7
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1991) (recognizing failure of delivered product to conform to contractually specified dimensions as a basis for breach of express warranty); Loris Stavrinidis, LTD. v. Graphic
Equip. World Wide, No. 79 Civ. 5001 (CBM), 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9797, at *18–20 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 31, 1981) (affirming defendant liability for breach of express warranty where press sold to
buyer did not conform to the dimensions listed on the contract).
97. See N. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 412 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[A]
separate express warranty was created by the technical specifications . . . .”); Capital Equip. Enters.,
Inc. v. N. Pier Terminal Co., 254 N.E.2d 542, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (affirming jury verdict for
the plaintiff where the defendant was liable for breach of express warranty arising out of equipment
not conforming to seller specifications of capacity to lift and overall condition).
98. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 457–58 (6th
ed. 2010) (addressing the change from “reliance” in the Uniform Sales Act to “basis of the bargain”
in the U.C.C. and pointing to both the lack of import assigned to and equivocal nature of the phrase
“basis of the bargain”); see also U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2017–2018) (explaining that proof of reliance is not required if the affirmation is part of a description).
99. U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
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(f), and that the failure to be merchantable proximately caused the plaintiff
harm. 100 As evident from the number of subsections, a lack of merchantability can be found in a variety of ways. For example, cases have established
feed which made farm animals sick was not fit for its ordinary purpose 101 and
a shipment of lumber with different types of plywood and warped plywood
was not of even kind and quality. 102
Finally, the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may also
arise in a sale of goods. Section 2-315 provides that if a seller has reason to
know of any particular purpose for which the buyer is purchasing the goods,
and also that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting
the particular goods, then there exists an implied warranty “that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.” 103 Although actual communication need not
occur between buyer and seller regarding the particular purpose for purchasing the goods, 104 given the nature of an online transaction, which takes place
without a physical salesperson, it seems unlikely this warranty could be available in a purely online transaction. 105 However, it is possible that liability
could attach if a buyer called a sales representative prior to purchasing a product online or perhaps communicated electronically during the purchasing
process. 106
100. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 480–81 (explaining the implied warranty of
merchantability, including its elements and relationship to tort liability).
101. See Duxbury v. Spex Feeds, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 380, 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (noting an
implied warranty of merchantability arose because Spex was in the business of furnishing animal
feed, and its substandard corn caused illness and economic loss to Duxburys: “[An] implied warranty of merchantability provides that the product is fit for its ordinary and intended use”).
102. See Gulf Trading Corp. v. Nat’l Enters., 912 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D.V.I. 1996) (asserting
various evidence supported a “finding that the kind, quality and quantity of much of the goods
shipped . . . were often different from what was ordered” and thus not merchantable).
103. U.C.C. § 2-315.
104. Id. § 2-315 cmt. 1 (“Under this [S]ection the buyer need not bring home to the seller actual
knowledge of the particular purpose for which the goods are intended or of his reliance on the
seller’s skill and judgment, if the circumstances are such that the seller has reason to realize the
purpose intended or that the reliance exists.”).
105. A recent class action decision by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, quoting a comment to § 2-315, stated:
The buyer need not directly communicate the particular purpose to [the seller] as “[a]
buyer need not bring home to the seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for
which the goods are intended or of his reliance on the seller’s skill and judgment, if the
circumstances are such that the seller has reason to realize the purpose intended.”
In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772, 802–03 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (quoting U.C.C. § 2315 cmt. 1); see Olympic Arms, Inc. v. Green, 176 S.W.3d 567, 582–83 (Tex. App. 2004) (noting
a catalog explaining custom barrels with additional specifications serves as some evidence to raise
an issue of fact to determine whether there was a breach of implied warranty).
106. Cf. Yossi v. Shapiro, No. CV095031240S, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1678, at *1–3, *19
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 1, 2010) (upholding claims for misrepresentation where an online buyer
subject to online auction terms contacted the auction enterprise prior to purchase to inquire about
the authenticity of a piece of art); Groover v. Ogunyemi, No. 2004-11-349, 2006 WL 2615151, at
*1, *4 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 5, 2006) (permitting claims to proceed where the defendant’s advertisement “on E-Bay [contained] a telephone number, which [the plaintiff] testified calling . . . .”).
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C. Buyer’s Remedies
A buyer’s remedies for breach of a seller’s contract come in two basic
varieties: remedies for non-performance of the contract (as in the case of a
failure to deliver the goods or in a proper case of rejection or revocation of
the goods) and remedies for failure of the product to perform as advertised
(such as breach of warranty remedies). 107 For non-performance, the U.C.C.
affords buyers two options for recovery. 108 The buyer can either choose to
“cover”—that is, buy a reasonable substitute and sue for the difference in
price 109—or they can choose the “market” measure of damages and recover
the “difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned
of the breach and the contract price.” 110 Once the buyer accepts the goods,
the remedies available are governed by Section 2-714 of the U.C.C., which
provides: “The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.” 111
Importantly, under all of the remedies discussed above, the buyer is entitled to incidental and consequential damages under Section 2-715. 112 Incidental damages include “expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt,
transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with

Although in neither case did the plaintiff prevail on a U.C.C. § 2-315 claim specifically, the possibility clearly exists.
107. See John A. Sebert, Jr., Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code:
An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360, 364–65 (1981) (reviewing remedies for buyers and
sellers under the U.C.C., including an exposition on arguments for and against market damages).
108. U.C.C. § 2-711 (providing that an aggrieved buyer may seek “cover” damages or recover
under § 2-713 (“market” measure)).
109. Id. § 2-712.
110. Id. § 2-713(1). The comments indicate that if the buyer chooses to cover, the buyer is
limited to that remedy and may not seek the “market” measure of damages. See id. § 2-713 cmt. 5
(“The present [S]ection provides a remedy which is completely alternative to cover under the preceding [S]ection and applies only when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered.”); see also
David Frisch, The Compensation Myth and U.C.C. Section 2-713, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 173, 182–96
(2014) (discussing market and cover damages and offering two assumptions underlying full compensation rhetoric); Sebert, supra note 107, at 380–81 (noting that while there is room to debate
whether a buyer could seek the market measure after covering, “this interpretation runs counter to
the general objective of contract remedies and of the Code—to put the aggrieved party in as good a
position, but no better, than he would have been in had the contract been performed. The aggrieved
party is fully compensated by a recovery based upon the actual resale or cover price, and there is no
justification for increasing the breacher’s damage liability merely because a hypothetical market
price is different from the actual resale or cover price.”).
111. U.C.C. § 2-714(2). This Section is subject to U.C.C. § 2-607, however, which requires
that the buyer notify the seller of the breach “within a reasonable time after he discovers or should
have discovered any breach” or be barred from recovery. Id. § 2-607(3)(a).
112. See id. §§ 2-712–14 (specifying that additional incidental and consequential damages may
be available under § 2-715).
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effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or
other breach.” 113 As for consequential damages, the U.C.C. differentiates
between injuries to person or property and pure economic harm. 114 For pure
economic harm, a buyer must prove that the damages were either generally
or specifically foreseeable and also must attempt to mitigate the consequential damages if possible. 115 However, for injuries to person or property, the
U.C.C. does away with foreseeability and the mitigation principle, but requires that the injuries be “proximately” caused by the breach of warranty. 116
D. How to Limit Warranties and Remedies Under the U.C.C.
The implied warranty of merchantability, as suggested by its name, is
implicit in every merchant’s sale of goods. A breach of this warranty can
lead to consequential damages that are disproportionate to the value of the
sold good itself. Therefore, it is understandable why many sellers seek to
disavow such warranties and liability. The U.C.C. explicitly permits such
disclaimers but with some caveats.
The first, more difficult way a seller may disclaim both the implied warranty of merchantability and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
falls under U.C.C. Section 2-316(2), which provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous,
and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that “There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof.” 117
This provision requires that a written disclaimer of merchantability specifically mention merchantability and be conspicuous. 118 Similarly, disclaimers on warranties of fitness that are in writing must also be conspicuous,

113. Id. § 2-715(1).
114. Id. § 2-715(2).
115. Id. (defining consequential damages as “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise”); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at
528–29, 535.
116. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 537.
117. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
118. “Conspicuous” is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(b) as follows:
(10) “Conspicuous”, with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented
that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether
a term is “conspicuous” or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the
following:
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but the U.C.C. does not specifically require mention of a particular word or
phrase, such as “warranty” or “fitness.” 119 Nonetheless, it is not unusual for
a typical disclaimer to specifically mention both implied warranties by
name. 120
To satisfy the conspicuousness requirement, sellers typically follow the
definition provided in the U.C.C., which suggests using all capital letters in
the heading and other methods where “attention can reasonably be expected
to be called to it.” 121 However, some courts held that it is not enough simply
to capitalize the heading or to capitalize particular words, such as “merchantability” and “fitness for a particular purpose,” as doing so does not draw attention to the fact that the warranties are disclaimed. 122 In response, some
sellers find it prudent to print the entire disclaimer in bold-face capital letters. 123
Though Section 2-316(2) is somewhat demanding in how to properly
disclaim implied warranties, subsection (3) provides a number of simpler and
effective alternatives. The one most relevant to online sales of goods is subsection (3)(a), which provides: “[A]ll implied warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is’, ‘with all faults’ or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty.” 124 In essence, this permits
sellers to fashion a general disclaimer, but courts do not look kindly on what
might otherwise appear to be equivalent language. For example, simply excluding “all warranties express or implied” is ineffective to disclaim the implied warranties. 125 Out of an abundance of caution, many sellers appear to

(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in
contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and
(B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding
text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set
off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention
to the language.
Id. § 1-201(b)(10).
119. Id. § 2-316(2). Though the U.C.C. does explicitly approve of the phrase “There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof” to exclude warranties of fitness,
this would be insufficient to disclaim the warranty of merchantability. Id.
120. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 577–79.
121. U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 10.
122. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Pike, 466 S.W.2d 901, 907 (Ark. 1971); Massey-Ferguson,
Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Ky. 1969).
123. Parsley v. Monaco Coach Corp., 327 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800–02 (W.D. Mich. 2004); WHITE
& SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 581 n.14.
124. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
125. Boeing Airplane Co. v. O’Malley, 329 F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964) (“[T]he [fitness] disclaimer may not be merely by use of the clause disclaiming ‘all warranties express or implied’ . . . .”); see also Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (rendering ineffective exclusion language stating “[w]e make no other or further warranty, express or
implied” as applied to the implied warranty of merchantability).
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use both the “as is” language from Section 2-316(3)(a) and specifically disclaim the warranties of merchantability and fitness by name in accord with
Section 2-316(2)—both in conspicuous language. 126 Although there is no
express requirement that an “as is” type of clause be conspicuous, many
courts require such. 127
In addition to excluding implied warranties, Section 2-719(1) allows
sellers to limit a buyer’s potential remedies, providing:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of
damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer’s remedies to return of the goods and repayment of
the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy. 128
Because subsection (b) states that the limited remedy is optional, unless
it is expressly agreed to be exclusive, some sellers have found themselves
liable to buyers when they have used sloppy language that did not make clear
that a remedy was “exclusive.” 129 Furthermore, many sellers make such ex-

126. See Man Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows, 434 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Tex. 2014) (illustrating a manufacturer sold a yacht with a certificate of acceptance of vessel’s letterhead that stated
“as is” and “disclaimed any implied warranty at the time of first sale”); LaBella v. Charlie Thomas,
Inc., 942 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding Mercedes-Benz’s expressly disclaimed warranties
were sufficiently conspicuous); Singleton v. LaCoure, 712 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App. 1986) (holding seller’s “as is” disclaimer regarding a purchased trailer on the front of the invoice was conspicuous based on a reasonable person standard).
127. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 586; see also, e.g., Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS
Air Corp., No. 00-CV-1657 (BSJ), 2002 WL 31453789, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2002) (confirming
validity of “as-is” clause with bold face disclaimer in sale of airplane engine); Woodruff v. Clark
Cty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, 286 N.E.2d 188. 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (requiring “as-is” disclaimer conspicuity in sale of chickens).
128. U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
129. See, e.g., Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 276 (D. Me. 1977)
(focusing on the U.C.C. requirement that contractual remedies be labeled and agreed to as exclusive
if they are to be upheld as such); Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 465 S.W.2d 80, 84–85 (Ark. 1971) (delineating application of “exclusive” language between paragraphs despite clear intent for the language to apply to remedies).
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clusions conspicuous as some courts hold that remedy limitations, like warranty exclusions, must be conspicuous, though no such requirement is found
in the text. 130
Subsection (1) permits limitation of remedies, subject to two statutory
limitations: (1) the exclusive or limited remedy cannot “fail of its essential
purpose” 131 and (2) restrictions on consequential damages that are unconscionable “may be limited or excluded.” 132 As to the first limitation, Comment 1 notes that “it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least
minimum adequate remedies be available” and that where other circumstances cause an otherwise fair clause “to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions
of [Article 2].” 133 Under this subsection, a remedy limitation would fail if,
for instance, the seller fails to effectively repair or replace a defective good
within a reasonable time period134 or if the buyer is unable to tender the goods
for repair due to their complete destruction. 135
Subsection (3) provides that restrictions on consequential damages that
are unconscionable “may be limited or excluded.” 136 This subsection goes
further than Section 2-302, which generally governs unconscionability, 137 in
that it contains a special provision for limitations on personal injury consequential damages. Section 2-719(3) states that “for injury to the person in
the case of consumer goods” such limitations are “prima facie unconscionable.” 138 Thus, subsection (3) explicitly authorizes contractual exclusions on
130. See, e.g., Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 324 N.E.2d 583, 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974)
(construing U.C.C. § 2-719 to include a requirement that exclusive remedy clauses be made conspicuous); see also Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (2012) (“[A]
warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any written or implied
warranty . . . unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty . . . .”); Sorce v. Naperville Jeep Eagle, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (clarifying that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act permits the “exclusion of consequential damages” if
“the exclusion appears conspicuously on the face of the warranty”). But see Boone Valley Coop.
Processing Ass’n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606, 612 (N.D. Iowa 1974) (applying
unconscionability standard rather than conspicuous standard to limitations of remedies clauses).
131. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
132. Id. § 2-719(3).
133. Id. at cmt. 1.
134. See Nation Enters., Inc. v. Enersyst, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1506, 1513–14 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(applying Texas law regarding failure of remedy for essential purpose); Beal v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973) (stripping a remedy exclusion of its effect based on the warrantor’s failure to timely correct the defect); Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d
844, 854 (Tex. App. 1986) (noting the warranty failed for essential purpose when the seller was
unable to repair the good in a reasonable time).
135. See Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 982 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he
‘repair or replace’ language of the contract failed of its essential purpose, especially since the defective part was small, and the defect resulted in the immediate destruction of the entire tractor
shovel.”).
136. U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
137. Id. § 2-302.
138. Id. § 2-719(3).
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consequential damages, subject to the usual burden of the plaintiff to show
that such clause is unconscionable, but shifts the burden to the seller in a
narrow class of cases that involve consumer goods and a limitation on injuries
to person. 139
E. Are Such Clauses Effective?
As noted above, clauses limiting warranties and remedies can be effective if drafted properly. 140 However, not all online terms and conditions are
drafted in such a way as to be effective. A small percentage of retailers have
warranty disclaimers that do not meet the definition of “conspicuous” under
the U.C.C. 141 Other retailers use ambiguous language as to whether their
warranty and damage limitations are only with regard to the use of their website, as opposed to the goods that are sold. 142 However, assuming that such
retailers would quickly alter their language the first time a dispute raised the
issue, the next question becomes whether such clauses, even well-worded
ones, are enforceable against an aggrieved buyer. With regard to warranty
and remedy limitations, the answer depends largely on the type of injury involved.
Consider two scenarios. In the first, a defective product causes personal
injury, such as by severely burning the buyer/plaintiff. In the second scenario, the buyer/plaintiff is not personally injured, but the defective product
damages itself and causes pure economic injuries to the plaintiff, including
foreseeable consequential damages. The warranty and remedy limitation
clauses will be treated differently in each of these scenarios and, therefore,
each must be explored separately.
1. Injuries to Person or Property
If a plaintiff suffers injury to person or property due to a faulty product,
such a plaintiff may pursue damages in strict product liability despite the
presence of a clause claiming to limit warranties and damages. Section 1 of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability states, “One engaged in
the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the defect.” 143 Restatement Section 18 goes on to address the effect warranty disclaimers and damage limitation clauses should have on such
139. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 609–16 (explaining the two elements in detail).
140. See supra Section III.D.
141. See Marks, supra note 2, at 38 n.246 (noting that, of the 113 retailers studied, 6 used language that would fail to qualify as conspicuous under the U.C.C.).
142. Id. at 31–36 (discussing the ambiguity of words such as “materials” and “contents” in the
context of disclaimers).
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that “[o]ne who

272

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:247

claims, stating: “Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers
or other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid
products liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products
for harm to persons.” 144
Thus, in the above hypothetical, where a product, such as a laptop, burns
a consumer due to a faulty battery, the consumer can sue both the retailer
who sold the laptop and the manufacturer in tort for strict products liability.
This is true even in the presence of a contractually agreed upon waiver or
limitation, as “[i]t is presumed that the ordinary product user or consumer
lacks sufficient information and bargaining power to execute a fair contractual limitation of rights to recover.” 145 Despite the Restatement’s view that
liability should attach to both the retailer and the manufacturer, a number of
states have passed legislation barring a strict liability action against non-manufacturer sellers, such as retailers, though many caveat that the exemption is
premised upon there being jurisdiction over the manufacturer. 146
sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold”).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing that
§ 402A “is not governed by the provisions of the . . . Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties;
and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties,” and that “[t]he consumer’s cause of action . . . is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be
between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the
consumer’s hands”).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1998). Comment d to that same Section makes an exception for informed consumers represented
by powerful bargaining allies. Id. at cmt. d.
146. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (West, Westlaw through 82 Laws 2019, ch. 4) (providing various defenses for a seller to assert in response to actions for defective design or manufacturing, including a seller’s lack of knowledge of the defect, opportunity to discover the defect, and
control of the defective product); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1407 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d
Reg. Sess. 64th Leg.) (protecting nonmanufacturer product sellers from liability if they lack
knowledge of the product’s defect and did not have reasonable opportunity to assess the product in
a manner that would or should uncover the product’s defect); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18 (West,
Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (substantially limiting the products liability of nonmanufacturers
in strict liability suits based on breach of implied warranty of merchantability or tort); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3306 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (barring product liability claims against
product sellers and those who are retail sellers of used products, provided certain factors are established); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.) (conditioning a
seller’s protection from liability in a product liability action on the manufacturer being “identified
and subject to the jurisdiction of the court”); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-405 (West,
Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess. Gen. Assemb.) (articulating various defenses available for sellers
in a products liability action unless, among other exceptions, the “manufacturer is not subject to
service of process” under Maryland law); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West, Westlaw through
2018 Reg. Sess.) (limiting the product liability of nonmanufacturers unless they “exercised some
significant control over the design or manufacture of the product,” “had actual knowledge of the
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Even without tort liability as an option, a buyer/plaintiff that suffers injury to their person may still be able to avoid the implications of “as is” warranty waivers and limitations on liabilities, though the basis for such avoidance seems to stand on somewhat shaky statutory ground. The invalidation
of some warranty disclaimers appears to be based on an unintended reading
of U.C.C. Sections 2-302, 2-316, and 2-719(3). If a retailer complies with
Section 2-316 in disclaiming warranties, an argument can be made that Section 2-302, dealing with unconscionability, need not be implicated. 147 Section 2-316 lays out how to draft an enforceable disclaimer and makes no mention, in either the text or the comments, of unconscionability; 148 however,
courts have been willing to nonetheless apply Section 2-302, particularly in
the consumer context. 149

defect in the product,” or “created the defect in the product”); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.762 (Westlaw
through 2018 2d Reg. Sess. & 1st Extraordinary Sess. 99th Gen. Assemb.) (allowing for the dismissal from a products liability claim of “[a] defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as
a seller in the stream of commerce”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,181 (West, Westlaw through
2d Reg. Sess. 105th Leg. (2018)) (prohibiting strict liability actions for product defect to be “commenced or maintained against any seller or lessor of a product” that did not also manufacture the
product or the allegedly defective part); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-2 (West, Westlaw through
S.L. 2018-145 2018 Reg. Sess. & Extra Sess. Gen. Assemb.) (shielding sellers from product liability
if they lacked an opportunity to inspect, unless “the manufacturer of the product is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of [North Carolina] or if such manufacturer has been judicially declared
insolvent”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78 (West, Westlaw through Files 115–67, 169, 170, 172
132d Gen. Assemb. (2017–2018), 2017 State Issue 1, & 2018 State Issue 1) (limiting a supplier’s
products liability to instances when the supplier’s negligence caused the complainant’s harm, the
product failed to conform to the supplier’s representation, or the complainant cannot successfully
bring an action against the manufacturer); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (Westlaw through 2018
Reg. & Spec. Sess., Sup. Ct. Rule 18-15 & Nov. 2018 election) (immunizing nonmanufacturer dealers and sellers of a defective product from strict liability unless they knew, or should have known,
of the product’s defect); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (West, Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg.
Sess. 110th Gen. Assemb.) (excepting sellers from products liability unless the seller played a role
in causing the defect or provided an express warranty, or the product’s manufacturer is not subject
to Tennessee jurisdiction); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
Sess.) (requiring a product seller to assume the manufacturer’s liability to a claimant if the manufacturer is not subject to Washington jurisdiction).
147. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 231.
148. U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018); see WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 231-32 (questioning the use of § 2-302 as applied to disclaimers compliant with § 2-316).
149. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“Generally,’ . . . courts have not been solicitous of businessmen in the name of unconscionability.’ This is
probably because courts view businessmen as possessed of a greater degree of commercial understanding and substantially more economic muscle than the ordinary consumer. Hence, a businessman usually has a more difficult time establishing procedural unconscionability in the sense of either
‘unfair surprise’ or ‘unequal bargaining power.’” (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at
170)); Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651–52 (N.J. 1971) (attempting to clarify the concept of
unconscionability in the consumer context by calling it “an amorphous concept” and intended to
“effectuate the public purpose” by ensuring that “marketers of consumer goods are brought to an
awareness that the restraint of unconscionability is always hovering over their operations”); Fischer
v. General Elec. Hotpoint, 438 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (N.Y. Dist. 1981) (declaring unconscionable a
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This unintended reading opens the door to the following argument: If a
warranty disclaimer prevents a consumer from bringing suit for a personal
injury, the clause is prima facie unconscionable under Section 2-719(3), as it
would also prevent the consumer from recovering consequential damages. 150
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it conflates liability with the
damage limitation. 151 Indeed, the comments to Section 2-316 lay this out,
specifically stating:
This Article treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential
damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate from
the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no warranty
exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach
of warranty. Under subsection (4) the question of limitation of
remedy is governed by the sections referred to rather than by this
section. 152
Despite this explicit statement, in the context of personal injuries to consumers, courts seem more willing to engage in a deeper scrutiny of such
clauses. Or as Professors White and Summers concluded, “In light of the
cases decided thus far, we suspect that whenever a consumer’s blood is
spilled, even wild horses could not stop a sympathetic court from plowing
through the most artfully drafted and conspicuously printed disclaimer clause
in order to grant relief.” 153
2. Pure Economic Losses
A consumer who suffers pure economic injury is much less likely to be
able to avoid the effect of these clauses. Without a harm to person or property, the injured consumer will be relegated to contract to seek redress under
the economic loss rule. Professor Vincent Johnson offered the following illustration:

clause in a contract between a consumer and a corporate defendant); see also Edith Resnick Warkentine, Article 2 Revisions: An Opportunity to Protect Consumers and “Merchant/Consumers”
Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 50–53 (1996) (discussing different approaches courts take when reviewing contracts between merchants and consumers, merchants and
merchants, and merchants and hybrid merchant/consumers).
150. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 609–16; see also William L. Stallworth, An Analysis
of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1215, 1237 (1993) (“Section 2719(3) provides that the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages for personal injury is
prima facie unconscionable in the case of consumer goods.”).
151. See U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (stating that “[r]emedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on . . . contractual modification of remedy,” indicating that once there is a breach, a contractual limitation would apply); see also WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 98, at 598–99 (discussing the interplay between U.C.C. §§ 2-316 and 2-719).
152. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 2.
153. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 620.
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[I]f a person buys a can of paint and applies the paint to a door, the
person has a potential tort claim (and perhaps a contract claim as
well based on breach of warranty) if toxic odors from the paint
make the plaintiff sick or if the paint eats away at the door and
damages that “other” property. However, if the paint simply fails
to adhere to the door effectively and flakes off, or quickly discolors, causing no other damage but making the paint’s purchase a
waste of money, the buyer’s sole avenue for recovery is rooted in
contract principles. 154
Thus, a consumer would be limited to a claim in contract and normal
contract principles of enforceability would apply. This limits the consumer’s
ability to avoid the waivers of warranties, limitations on damages, and enforcement of arbitration provisions.
As noted above, a consumer who suffers a personal injury gets the advantage of a presumption that the limitation on consequential damages (and
sometimes warranty waivers) are prima facie unconscionable. 155 If the harm
is purely economic, however, the burden shifts back to the consumer to show
that the clauses are unconscionable. 156 This is no small task. First, there is
some question as to whether a properly drafted waiver of implied warranties
is even subject to an unconscionability defense.157 Assuming it is, attacking
any clause as unconscionable would require a showing that the term is unconscionable under the classic two-part analysis of procedural and substantive unconscionability. Section 2-302(1) of the U.C.C. provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result. 158
Though the U.C.C. does not define the term “unconscionable,” the oftcited Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, Co. 159 court famously described
it as follows: “Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
154. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 523, 550–51 (2009).
155. U.C.C. § 2-719(3); see also Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a ContractBased Liability Regime, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 213 (1998) (reiterating the burden-switching element of § 2-719(3) related to the unconscionability of exclusions on consequential damages in cases
of personal injury).
156. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 610–12.
157. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text. It should be noted that if such a clause
failed to meet § 2-316, such as by failing to be conspicuous, it should not be given effect and unconscionability would never come into play. Id.
158. U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
159. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 160 Most
courts follow renowned contracts scholar Professor Arthur Leff’s two-part
analysis of examining the contract or clause for both procedural and substantive unconscionability. 161 Procedural unconscionability looks to the contract
formation, while substantive unconscionability looks to whether the terms
themselves are overly harsh. 162 Plaintiffs have successfully voided warranty
disclaimers, 163 liability limitations,164 and arbitration clauses 165 all on this basis. However, the argument that online terms and conditions are unconscionable faces some obstacles.
160. Id. at 449.
161. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 220-30; Hillman, supra note 70, at 93; Arthur Allen
Leff, Unconscionability and The Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487
(1967); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nelson, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 351 (2011)
(“Proving unconscionability normally requires a showing of circumstances indicating an ‘adhesive’
bargain (so-called ‘procedural unconscionability’) as well as unfair contract terms (‘substantive unconscionability’).”).
162. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 98, at 220–24 (discussing procedural unconscionability);
Id. at 225 (describing how the cases disclose that clauses found substantively unconscionable fall
within one of two headings, including excessive price cases); id. at 225–30 (analyzing cases which
held that excessive price rendered a contract unconscionable); see also Elvy, supra note 57, at 888–
96 (reviewing the two distinct pieces of unconscionability).
163. Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 292 n.5 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining the
favorable and unfavorable position on whether unconscionability claims are applicable to warranty—AP disclaimers and stating, “Most courts have impliedly adopted the . . . view . . . that warranty disclaimers are subject to the § 2-302 unconscionability rules”); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree,
632 F.2d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[T]hough the disclaimer may be conspicuous so that the buyer
is aware of it, unconscionability may still exist if the disclaimer is oppressive.”).
164. Jasphy v. Osinsky, 834 A.2d 426, 432 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (permitting application of an unconscionability claim to contractual liability limitations despite the allowance of such
limitations in the U.C.C.); Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1054 (Vt. 2011) (“For the reasons outlined above, we conclude that the contract’s limited liability and binding arbitration provisions are unconscionable and thus unenforceable.”). But see Canal Electric Co. v. Westinghouse
Electric Co., 973 F.2d 988, 997 (1st Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply unconscionability to a liability
limitation clause but narrowing the decision to consequential damages and notating the plaintiff had
not requested non-consequential damages).
165. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Thus, a
contract to arbitrate is unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability when there is ‘both a
procedural and substantive element of unconscionability.’ . . . While it is within this court’s discretion to sever unconscionable provisions, because an ‘insidious pattern’ exists in Circuit City’s arbitration agreement[,] . . . we conclude that the agreement is wholly unenforceable.” (first quoting
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002); then citing Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002))); Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg.
Co., 70 F. App’x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the defense of unconscionability to an arbitration clause). As noted above, increasingly, in light of the Supreme Court’s aggressive application
of the FAA, unconscionability arguments are harder to successfully make. See supra notes 76–88
and accompanying text; see also Ramona L. Lampley, “Underdog” Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1727, 1741 (2015) (“While Concepcion could not have wholly removed
unconscionability as a general contract defense to a truly one-sided arbitral agreement, it did significantly limit the contours under which that defense could be asserted. No longer is the argument
that arbitration agreements are unfair because they remove the class device valid. This is true even
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Procedurally, buyers who seek to avoid clauses found only online might
be able to argue that, as these terms are not found when shopping in-store at
a brick-and-mortar branch, it would constitute unfair surprise to impose them
only on online transactions. But, cutting against this argument is that when
there is no rush to purchase, buyers have the luxury of browsing the terms
and conditions at their leisure, and they do so in the comfort of their own
home before making a purchasing decision. Of course, behavioral law and
economics has taught us that few buyers will ever read these terms, 166 but
that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the terms and conditions
are unconscionable, and the case law decided thus far seems to lean against
procedural unconscionability. 167
As for substantive unconscionability, buyers could claim that the effect
of these clauses is to deny them any realistic chance at recovery for a faulty
good that causes economic harm. Even in states that do not require privity
with the manufacturer, many buyers may find that their lack of bargaining
power makes negotiating an informal settlement of their claim (such as by
repair or replace) less effective than if the retailer had just returned the product. And in states that do require privity of contract, buyers whose retailers
disclaimed all warranties may find that they have no suit. However, at least
two counter-arguments levy against such claims. First, the very fact that the
U.C.C. recognizes the ability to add such clauses, explicitly in the case of
for traditionally ‘underdog’ claims.”); Stipanowich, supra note 161, at 428–29 (detailing the evolution of arbitration clause enforcement, recognizing the contemporaneous negative judicial stance on
using unconscionability to attack arbitration clauses, and suggesting editing the FAA to include “a
set of standards operating as a floor for protection of consumers and employees”).
166. Robert A. Hillman & Ibrahim Barakat, Warranties and Disclaimers in the Electronic Age,
11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2008) (“[E]vidence mounts that people do not and will not carefully
read their e-standard forms . . . .”); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing
Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 167, 173 (2017) (positing that “consumers are unlikely
to evaluate terms before assent” and noting that the Restatement approach to assent encourages
companies to flag terms, “even though it will not change anything about consumer choice ex ante”).
167. Preston, supra note 1, at 546 (“In short, current standards for denying claims of procedural
unconscionability are sufficiently low that they would rout unconscionability challenges for almost
all wrap contracts.”); see, e.g., Plazza v. Airbnb, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 537, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(rebuffing the plaintiff’s claim that Airbnb’s arbitration provision was hidden and, therefore, procedurally unconscionable because the plaintiff could have accessed and read the provision when he
initially created an Airbnb user account but admittedly did not do so); Zepher v. Kaiser Found.
Hosp., 687 Fed. App’x 636, 639 (9th Cir. 2017) (declining to declare as procedurally unconscionable a general release agreement signed by a former employee because she “admittedly did not read
the General Release and there [was] no objective evidence . . . to support [her] belief that she had
no power to negotiate the terms of her retirement package”); Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson,
No. 3:10-CV-76, 2014 WL 496775, at *12 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 6, 2014) (rejecting the possibility that
the plaintiff was an unsophisticated consumer held to procedurally unconscionable terms in part
because the plaintiff “failed to identify any conduct on the part of [the defendant] that prevented
him from reading and reviewing the contract” and “did not allege that he was illiterate or unable to
read the contract”); Schultz v. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-15, 2013 WL 3365244, at *11
(N.D.W. Va. July 3, 2013) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ procedural unconscionability claim in part because they “were educated consumers, and they had ample time to read the contract—whether or
not they chose to do so”).
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warranty and liability limitations, lends credibility to the presence of such
terms. Second, almost all retailers, except in the food service and grocer industries, provide for returns. 168 Though these return policies may be shorter
than the statute of limitations, the presence of a return period offers the buyer
a set period within which to return the product for a full refund or exchange,
ameliorating the ill effects of the other clauses.
3. Compliance with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
In addition to the above limitations, clauses that limit implied warranties, damages, and, in some jurisdictions, even clauses that provide for arbitration may be affected by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA” or
“the Act”). 169 This federal act applies to the sale of consumer products, defined as “any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce
and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes.” 170
If the Act applies to a transaction, it sets minimum standards for express warranties that are made, 171 provides for a limitation on the ability to disclaim
implied warranties, and makes remedies for breach of such warranties easier
to access. 172 The Act permits consumers to bring suit in state or federal
court 173 and provides that a prevailing plaintiff can recover attorneys’ fees. 174
The MMWA applies to any consumer product warrantors. 175 Thus, the
Act loosens vertical privity requirements that might normally be an obstacle
for downstream purchasers of goods by extending liability to suppliers. Furthermore, though there exists some authority for the proposition that the Act
only applies to those making express written warranties, 176 the weight of authority seems to favor application of the Act even where no express warranties have been made and a suit is brought for a breach of an implied warranty,
168. See Marks, supra note 2, at 47 tbl.5.2 (analyzing the terms and conditions of 113 of the
largest U.S. retailers and determining that retailers of the food service and grocer industries were
least likely to include return policy provisions).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012).
170. Id. § 2301(1).
171. Id. § 2304(a), (e).
172. Jonathon A. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C. L. REV. 835, 851–52, 862, 869–72 (1977).
173. 15 U.S.C § 2310(d)(1). For federal jurisdiction there are threshold requirements, such as
the amount in controversy must be at least $50,000. See id. § 2310(d)(3)(B).
174. Id. § 2310(d)(2).
175. Section 2310(d) of the MMWA provides that “a consumer who is damaged by the failure
of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or
under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and
other legal and equitable relief.” Id. § 2310(d)(1).
176. See Anderson v. Newmar Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (D. Minn. 2004); Gross v. Shep
Brown’s Boat Basin, No. Civ. 99-140-B, 2000 WL 1480373, at *2 (D.N.H. Feb. 28, 2000);
McNamara v. Nomeco Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1175 (D. Minn. 1998); Skelton
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 660 F.2d
311 (7th Cir. 1981).
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such as merchantability. 177 This could arise in a case where a seller makes
no written warranties but fails to disclaim implied warranties, such as the
warranty of merchantability, which, under state law, accompany all sales by
merchants unless properly disclaimed. 178
While the scope of liability as to who can be sued is enlarged by Section
2310(d) of the MMWA, retailers are not liable for simply selling consumer
goods that come with a manufacturer’s warranty, unless the retailer itself also
warrants the goods. 179 The Code of Federal Regulations makes this clear,
stating:
Section [2310(f)] of the Act . . . provides that only the supplier “actually making” a written warranty is liable for purposes of FTC and
private enforcement of the Act. A supplier who does no more than
distribute or sell a consumer product covered by a written warranty

177. See McCurdy v. Texar, Inc., 575 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Milicevic v. Fletcher Jones Imps., Ltd., 402 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Act’s consumer-suit
provision . . . supplies a federal remedy for breach of written and implied warranties . . . .” (quoting
Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001))); Rentas v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 936 So. 2d 747, 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (MMWA “provide[s] an independent federal cause of action for breach of warranty”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 874
(Iowa 1996) (“The Magnuson-Moss Act created a federal remedy for breach of written and implied
warranties falling within the statute”); CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW: LEMON LAW, MAGNUSON-MOSS, UCC, MANUFACTURED HOME,
AND OTHER WARRANTY STATUTES § 2.3.1.3 (5th ed. 2015); Christopher Smith, Private Rights of
Action Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, in PRACTICING LAW INST., COMMERCIAL LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 223, 225 (1985) (stating the MMWA allows consumers
to bring a federal action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness even if a
written warranty has not been given); Annotation, Consumer Product Warranty Suits in Federal
Court Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal—Trade Commission Improvement Act (15
U.S.C.A. § 2301 et seq.), 59 A.L.R. Fed. 461, 470 n.10 (1982) (“This provision has not only provided a means of enforcing the substantive requirements of the Act, but also has established a federal
cause of action for breach of an implied warranty which has arisen under state law even if no written
warranty was involved.”).
Though a claim under the MMWA may be brought for the breach of an implied warranty,
some courts do not view the MMWA as extending vertical privity to upstream manufacturers. See
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F. Supp. 1513, 1525 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 807
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“If, in this action, there are to be any implied warranty claims at all
under Magnuson-Moss, they must ‘originate’ from or ‘come into being’ from state law. Therefore,
if a State does not provide for a cause of action for breach of implied warranty where vertical privity
is lacking, there cannot be a Federal cause of action for such a breach.” (citation omitted)); Mendelson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 132, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff’d, 441 N.Y.S.2d 410
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (“[T]he term ‘implied warranty’ is defined as an ‘implied warranty arising
under State law.’ Thus, State vertical privity rules control and the applicable measure of damages
is that provided by State law.” (citation omitted)); Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., 12 Reasons to Love
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 11 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 127, 128 (2008).
178. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(f) (“Warrantors subject to enforcement of remedies. For purposes of this
[S]ection, only the warrantor actually making a written affirmation of fact, promise, or undertaking
shall be deemed to have created a written warranty, and any rights arising thereunder may be enforced under this [S]ection only against such warrantor and no other person.”).
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offered by another person or business and which identifies that person or business as the warrantor is not liable for failure of the written warranty to comply with the Act or rules thereunder. 180
Notably the retailer should identify the manufacturer as the warrantor,
and though the retailer may not be liable under the Act for an express warranty, unless it properly disclaims the implied warranties, other provisions of
the Act might still apply. 181
If the Act applies, and a written warranty was made, then a warrantor
must conspicuously designate the warranty as either a “full warranty” or a
“limited warranty.” 182 A “full warranty” comes with a number of conditions
that impact the enforceability of implied warranty disclaimers and damage
limitations clauses. Section 2304 of the Act lists a number of mandates, including that warrantors must remedy breaches of express warranties “within
a reasonable time and without charge” and further prohibits limiting the duration of implied warranties, permits exclusions or limitations on consequential damages for breach of any warranties that conspicuously appear on the
face of the warranty, and requires the warrantor to refund or replace, without
charge, the product if the warrantor is unable to remedy any alleged defect
after a reasonable number of attempts. 183 Importantly for consumers, the Act

180. 16 C.F.R. § 700.4 (2018).
181. See, e.g.,Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc., 353 F.3d 516, 526 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding
a lessor’s written, conspicuous disclaimer specifically mentioning merchantability sufficient to safeguard against a lessee’s MMWA claim for breach of implied warranty and improperly pled breach
of express warranty claim); Hemmings v. Camping Time RV Ctrs., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-1331-TWT,
2017 WL 4552896, at *5–6 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 11, 2017) (dismissing a consumer’s claims under
MMWA § 2310 against a seller after the consumer’s breach of express and implied warranties
claims failed because the seller had not “adopted the manufacturer’s warranty or assumed the performance of [that] warranty” and had conspicuously disclaimed all warranties in its sales agreement); Semitekol v. Monaco Coach Corp., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1027–30 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (upholding a motorhome dealer’s disclaimer of implied warranties, which “specifically state[d] ‘dealer’ in
the [S]ection identifying who was disclaiming the warranty,” after concluding that two purported
promises by the dealer were not written warranties for MMWA § 2308 purposes and thus could not
bar the dealer from disclaiming implied warranties); Rokicsak v. Colony Marine Sales & Serv., 219
F. Supp. 2d 810, 815 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (protecting a retailer from liability for an alleged breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability where the applicable purchase agreement “disclaimed all
warranties using clear and conspicuous language” that “ma[de] plain there were no warranties except ‘THOSE WRITTEN WARRANTIES PROVIDED BY THE MANUFACTURER’” that “specifically incorporat[ed] the term ‘merchantability’ into the waiver language and expressly disclaim[ed] any implied warranty of fitness”).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 2303. The Act defines a “written warranty” as:
[A]ny undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer
product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of
the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.
Id. § 2301(6)(B).
183. Id. § 2304.
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also prohibits a warrantor that makes an express written warranty from excluding implied warranties. 184 But even if a warrantor opts to go with a “limited warranty,” the Act prohibits the complete disclaimer of implied warranties, allowing a warrantor only to limit their duration to the extent of the
express warranties made. 185
Application of the MMWA may also affect the enforceability of arbitration clauses. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has promulgated
regulations that prohibit warrantors from compelling consumers to adhere to
binding arbitration for disputes involving the breach of a warranty under the
Act. 186 This regulation sits on shaky ground, however, as it may be in conflict
with the FAA. Although some courts have upheld the FTC’s position that
the MMWA prohibits warrantors from compelling consumers to adhere to
binding arbitration, 187 two federal circuits and numerous state courts take the
position that the FTC regulation does not prohibit binding arbitration because
the FAA preempts the FTC’s regulation. 188 Furthermore, recent opinions

184. Id. § 2308(a).
185. Id. § 2303.
186. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j) (“Decisions of the Mechanism shall not be legally binding on any
person.”). The CFR defines “mechanism” as “an informal dispute settlement procedure which is
incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of Title I of the Act applies,
as provided in [S]ection 110 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310.” Id. § 703.1(e).
187. See Higgs v. Warranty Grp., 2007 WL 2034376, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2007) (“The
arbitration provision is inapplicable . . . because the parties never manifested an understanding that
such claims would be arbitrated.”); Rickard v. Teynor’s Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 910, 921
(N.D. Ohio 2003) (“Thus, the MMWA precludes enforcement of binding arbitration agreements for
claims under a written warranty.”); Browne v. Kline Tysons Imps., Inc. 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831
(E.D. Va. 2002) (“A clear reading of the statute evinces Congress’ intent to encourage informal
dispute settlement mechanisms, yet not deprive any party of their right to have their written warranty
dispute adjudicated in a judicial forum.”); Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 723–
24 (Md. 2007) (“[U]nder the MMWA, claimants may not be forced to resolve their claims through
binding arbitration because Congress expressed an intent to preclude binding arbitration when it
enacted the MMWA. The FAA does not supersede the MMWA.”); Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle
Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 673 (S.C. 2007) (“Moreover, the MMWA has been interpreted to supersede the FAA with respect to consumer claims for breach of written warranty.” (citing Boyd v.
Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1437–38 (M.D. Ala. 1997))).
188. See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Magnuson–
Moss Warranty Act does not preclude binding arbitration of claims pursuant to valid binding arbitration agreement, which courts must enforce pursuant to the FAA.”); Richardson v. Palm Harbor
Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that § 703.5(j) does prohibit binding
arbitration; however, the FAA supersedes); accord Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Turner, 796 So. 2d
295, 296–97 (Ala. 2001) (holding that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act did not preclude enforcement of arbitration agreement in a warranty dispute); S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d
1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000) (Magnuson-Moss Act does not invalidate arbitration provisions in a written
warranty.); Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538 S.E.2d 73, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“MagnusonMoss Warranty Act did not preclude manufacturer from arbitrating purchaser’s express and implied
warranty claims.”), aff’d, 548 S.E.2d 342, 343 (Ga. 2001) (holding that arbitration clauses are not
unconscionable); In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 490 (Tex. 2001)
(“[N]othing in the Magnuson-Moss Act’s text, legislative history, or purposes preclude enforcement
of predispute binding arbitration agreements under the FAA . . . .”).
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from the Supreme Court have signaled an adherence to arbitration. 189 Even
in jurisdictions that find arbitration is not prohibited under the MMWA, a
warrantor may still be required to place the arbitration provision in the written
warranty, thus providing another basis to attack the validity of an arbitration
clause. 190
As previously discussed, the MMWA only applies in two possible situations: (1) if a written warranty is made, or (2) in some jurisdictions, even if
no warranty is made, the MMWA will apply if implied warranties are not
properly disclaimed. Given these limits and the broad use of warranty disclaimers, application of the MMWA to online transactions may be rare. As
noted, eighty-five percent of retailers I studied used some form of implied
warranty disclaimer, 191 and the vast majority of the retailers studied were not
the manufacturers of the goods sold. 192 Accordingly, it is unlikely that nonmanufacturer retailers would be subject to the Act’s provisions as no warranties, express or implied, are made in many of these instances. But, there are
a number of ways that the online merchants could nonetheless fall within the
scope of the Act.
First, some online retailers do make warranties as they are also the manufacturers of the goods. 193 In such cases, the Act would apply, as would the
above limitations.194 Second, online retailers may also be subject to the Act
189. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (“[The] text [of
the FAA] reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. And consistent
with that text, courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that ‘specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes,’ and ‘the rules
under which that arbitration will be conducted.’” (first quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 221 (1988); then quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 683 (2010))); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011) (“Arbitration is
a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations.” (citing Rent-aCtr. W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67–69 (2010))).
190. See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 177, at 128 (citing Cunningham v. Fleetwood
Homes of Ga., Inc. 253 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 2001)).
191. Marks, supra note 2, at 38.
192. Id. at 45 (reporting that 93 of the 113 retailers studied were non-manufacturer retailers).
193. For example, Apple’s website has a “Apple One (1) Year Limited Warranty” that provides
that Apple:
[W]arrants the Apple-branded iPhone, iPad, iPod, Apple TV, or HomePod hardware
product and the Apple-branded accessories contained in the original packaging (“Apple
Product”) against defects in materials and workmanship when used normally in accordance with Apple’s published guidelines for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of
original retail purchase by the end-user purchaser (“Warranty Period”). Apple’s published guidelines include but are not limited to information contained in technical specifications, user manuals and service communications.
See Legal, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/warranty/products/ios-warranty-document-us.html
(last updated July 13, 2018).
194. Apple seemingly recognizes that its own implied waiver provisions are not enforceable as
its website provides:
IN SO FAR AS SUCH WARRANTIES CANNOT BE DISCLAIMED, APPLE LIMITS
THE DURATION AND REMEDIES OF SUCH WARRANTIES TO THE DURATION
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if they offer service warranties or extended warranties with their products, as
the Act specifically applies to service contracts. 195 For instance, Best Buy
offers on its website a “Geek Squad® Protect & Support Plus” service contract that includes “Hardware Protection” (“If something breaks, we’ll repair
it. It’s that simple.”) and 24/7 technical support (“If you need help, we’re
standing by.”). 196 If a consumer purchases this additional protection, Best
Buy will be subject to the MMWA, and its attempts to disclaim implied warranties on the products sold will be invalidated. Third, and finally, online
retailers may be subject to the Act if they do not make clear that the warranties offered on a product come from a manufacturer rather than from them.
For instance, while shopping online for home fixtures, you might come
across a faucet with a brushed nickel finish that advertises a “limited lifetime
finish warranty” without mention that the warranty is actually made by the
manufacturer and not the retailer. 197 Such a retailer, through sloppy advertising, has now inadvertently made an express written warranty subjecting it
to the Act. 198
While it is unknown how many online retailers’ terms and conditions
would be subject to the MMWA, a brief review of a few websites reveals that
some sales either are or could be. 199 In some instances, the making of a warranty may be done knowingly, and the boilerplate disclaimers are, at best, the

OF THIS EXPRESS WARRANTY AND, AT APPLE’S OPTION, THE REPAIR OR
REPLACEMENT SERVICES DESCRIBED BELOW. SOME STATES (COUNTRIES
AND PROVINCES) DO NOT ALLOW LIMITATIONS ON HOW LONG AN
IMPLIED WARRANTY (OR CONDITION) MAY LAST, SO THE LIMITATION
DESCRIBED ABOVE MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.
See Legal, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/warranty/products/ios-warranty-document-us.html
(last updated July 13, 2018).
195. See Anderson v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 662 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 2011) (“It provides
a federal private cause of action for a warrantor’s failure to comply with the terms of a ‘written
warranty, implied warranty or service contract.’” (quoting Voelker v. Porsche Cars, Inc., 353 F.3d
516, 522 (7th Cir. 2003))); Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 904 So. 2d 450, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (“[T]he MMWA allows a ‘consumer’ to sue a supplier, warrantor, or manufacturer who fails
to comply with any obligation under the MMWA, a written warranty, an implied warranty, or a
service contract.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2001))).
196. See BEST BUY, INC., http://www.bestbuy.com/site/geek-squad-protection/geek-squad-protect-support-plus/pcmcat748300491884.c?id=pcmcat748300491884 (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
197. One of my research assistants actually ran across such an advertisement—a screen shot of
the faucet is on file.
198. Cf. Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 462, 465–67 (Ga. 1985) (holding that a
lessee of a DeLorean automobile was the third-party beneficiary of a contract between the manufacturer and original dealer in which the dealer undertook to address warranty claims, despite the
fact that the lessor (who bought the car from the dealer) had disclaimed warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose).
199. See, e.g., Geek Squad Protection, BEST BUY, INC., http://www.bestbuy.com/site/geeksquad-protection/geek-squad-protect-support-plus/pcmcat748300491884.c?id=pcmcat748300491884 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (offering an optional service plan); 5-Year Protect
Plan for Major Appliance $2000–$10000, HOME DEPOT, https://www.homedepot.com/p/5-YearProtect-Plan-for-Major-Appliance-2000-10000-N60MA9999/304130373 (last visited Jan. 23,
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result of an overcautious legal team, and, at worst, an attempt to fool customers into accepting less than they are entitled to under the law. Other online
retailers may be inadvertently subjecting themselves to the MMWA, though
careful drafting and website design could cure the defects exposing them to
liability.
IV. THE IN TERROREM EFFECT OF ONLINE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
So far, it has been established that the vast majority of the largest online
sellers prefer to use browsewrap to make consumers aware of the terms and
conditions that they are trying to impose, despite this being the least effective
“wrap” method available. 200 However, some consumers may actually read
the browsewrap (or at least click on it), in which case it has accomplished the
goal of notice. 201 But even if consumers read the browsewrap, or if the seller
uses a more effective form such as clickwrap, not all of the terms and conditions will be enforceable in every case. Personal injury claims may avoid
application limitations placed in the terms and conditions; and even if the
injury is purely economic, sloppy wording or design could lead to limitations
being ineffective, either as a matter of interpretation or due to the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act. 202
Given that many of the clauses could fail scrutiny for lack of notice and
that even those that survive notice scrutiny may be invalidated, the question
that must be asked is: Why go through all of the bother of inserting these
elaborate clauses, especially when the sellers don’t try to impose them in their
brick-and-mortar equivalents? One simple answer may be, why not? Even
with questionable enforceability of browsewrap agreements, there is a chance
the consumer will read and be bound by them, and the cost of inserting the
browsewrap link is minimal. 203 And even if a court finds a particular clause
objectionable, it is likely that only that clause will be voided—not the whole
2019) (same); LOWE’S, LOWE’S PRODUCT AND REPLACEMENT PLANS: TERMS AND CONDITIONS,
https://www.lowes.com/pdf/serv_elpp0004s0916_v5-0718.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (same).
200. See supra Section II.C.
201. See Preston, supra note 1, at 570 (contending that if the positioning of a hyperlink in a
visible manner can confer notice on a consumer sufficient to counter claims of unconscionability,
“then an admission of having followed the link and read any part of the wrap is utterly damning”);
cf. Matt Meinel, Requiring Mutual Assent in the 21st Century: How to Modify Wrap Contracts to
Reflect Consumer’s Reality, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 180, 197 (2016) (discounting the relevance
of the act of clicking to a browsewrap enforceability assessment, given that “the click itself does
not increase or decrease the chances that the consumer had notice of the terms and should not be
considered until after notice is established”).
202. See supra Section III.E.
203. See Kim, supra note 65, at 1349 (regarding the inclusion of onerous terms in online contracts as coming at “no additional cost to the website . . . , either with respect to the economic costs
of reproduction or loss of goodwill”); see also Preston, supra note 1, at 553 (distinguishing the costs
of online wrap versus in-store paper contracting, as “wrap contract drafters do not have to worry
about printer or paper costs, mailing or storage costs, or the cautionary impact of presenting a long
paper contract to a consumer in its obvious fullness”).
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contract. 204 But there may be another, stronger reason online sellers include
such terms, and that is the in terrorem effect they have on consumers. 205
If a consumer buys a wearable fitness tracker online through a site that
uses browsewrap terms and conditions, the consumer may very well proceed
to checkout without once considering matters such as implied warranties or
whether they have been disclaimed. 206 Indeed, it is likely the average consumer is unaware of the U.C.C. Article 2’s gap-filler warranties at all, let
alone how they can be disclaimed. 207 If the device begins to malfunction six
weeks later, the consumer’s first reaction might be to contact the online retailer. At this point, a company representative on the other side of the phone
might politely point out that the retailer, as part of the terms and conditions
that the consumer agreed to when completing the transaction, has a limited
thirty-day return policy for electronics and, further, that the retailer has disclaimed all warranties associated with the device—essentially selling the device as is. So, what is the typical consumer response in light of being presented with “contractual” language that is purportedly binding?
It turns out that the typical response is that the consumers assume they
are in fact bound, despite having never seen or been made aware of the
terms. 208 Thus, the mere presence of the language has a deterrent effect on
consumers pursuing the matter any further.209 In some instances, the online

204. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 166, at 171 (commenting that “if the worst thing that will
happen is that the term will get thrown out, there is no reason not to include it and hope for the
best”).
205. See id. at 121; Lydia P. Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 499–500
(2004) (noting, in the context of copyrights, that overreaching contractual terms in “shrinkwrap and
clickwrap licenses has a certain in terrorem effect on users”).
206. Schmitz, supra note 63, at 878 (assessing the tendency of consumers to read standard form
contracts and concluding that “consumers have become accustomed to not reading contracts due to
limited access, time, and ability to negotiate contract terms”).
207. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 468 (2002) (articulating e-consumers’ common beliefs that
reading online “boilerplate is unlikely to be of any benefit” and that “there is little risk to agreeing
to standard terms”).
208. See Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 25 (2002) (asserting that sellers’
persistence in using unenforceable terms stems from their knowledge that buyers typically believe
in the terms’ enforceability and comply with the terms without presenting a challenge); Preston,
supra note 1, at 555 (revealing the widespread practice of online retailers to draft wrap contracts
with disclaimer provisions known to be unenforceable because they are confident that consumers
“may well accept without question the company’s statement that they have waived all claims to
relief”); Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1127, 1136 (2009) (explaining “the obvious reason why one party would seek a clause it
knew to be unenforceable is that it believed the other party to be unaware of the fact and likely to
remain unaware of it[,]” perhaps due to a lack of “sophistication and legal counsel”).
209. See Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence From the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2017) (“Consumers might
be discouraged from claiming their rights through judicial procedure, given the in terrorem effect
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seller may even use the in terrorem terms to present itself as a “commendable” seller by telling the consumer that, though they don’t have to, they will
waive some provision or make some allowance, thus giving the impression
that the seller values its customers. 210 Of course, in both cases, this tactic
only works if consumers believe they are bound.
From the online seller’s perspective, this result achieves exactly what it
desires—the insertion of terms advantageous to the seller—without having
to worry about slowing down the online user experience or customizing its
particular terms. Furthermore, the online sellers can argue that the effect is
to direct the consumers to the real party at fault—the manufacturer of the
device. 211 Finally, online sellers can argue that the deterrent effect won’t
work on the really motivated consumers who, either due to the value of their
claim or simply stubborn persistence, continue to pursue a claim. 212 Thus,
the only claims deterred are low-value claims that consumers are not very
motivated to pursue anyway. 213 Eliminating such claims through in terrorem
clauses is an efficient way to save costs, which in turn are passed on to other
consumers. 214
produced by the mere appearance of the unenforceable provision in the contract.”); Sullivan, supra
note 208, at 1137–38 (analogizing the relationship between two contracting parties to a game of
chicken, which the drafter might win by including a contract term known to be unenforceable because “the existence of the (unenforceable) clause may itself deter the other party from the course
of action she would otherwise pursue”); see also Schmitz, supra note 63, at 871 (relating the unwillingness of consumers to “seek contract changes due to fear such requests will backfire or ‘rock
the boat’” to the in terrorem effect of certain contract language).
210. See Tal Kastner, The Persisting Ideal of Agreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 793, 808–09 (2010) (explaining the theory of Professor Jason Scott Johnston that
boilerplate terms can act “as a baseline from which agents of a firm have the discretion to negotiate
with consumers” and “to make exceptions to the standard terms on a case-by-case basis”); Preston,
supra note 1, at 556–57 (recognizing the ability for businesses, confronted with customers calling
to challenge harsh terms, to “make individualized determinations of which customers are worth
saving” and to “waive contract terms for individual cases” when “the caller appears to be a ‘desirable’ customer”).
211. Recall at the outset of Part II, many of the terms and conditions used are simply to take the
retailer out of the picture as a middleman in what should really be a dispute between the consumer
and the manufacturer. See infra Part II.
212. See Preston, supra note 1, at 557 (acknowledging the futility of the deterrence effect on
“the truly obstreperous [customers], and those with excess time and ability to articulate” their complaints but condemning the provision of exceptions for these customers as a practice that rewards
antagonistic behavior while “punishing the less aggressive”); see also R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J.
Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect
Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 674–75 (1996) (pointing out sellers’ differential ex-post treatment of buyers and their willingness to make contract exceptions for informed consumers who complain, while uninformed, non-complainers are left to tolerate the loss).
213. See Roger C. Bern, Terms Later Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea
for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 732–33 (2004) (observing the minimal costs that a seller incurs in the rare event that a disgruntled buyer is persistent
and successfully reverses a transaction or is granted an exception to boilerplate terms).
214. See Bates, supra note 208, at 4 (describing how standardized terms benefit sellers in the
form of efficiency-savings and buyers in the form of “the reduction in price that results when the
seller elects to pass the savings onto the consumer directly”).
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These arguments have some flaws, however. First, while some consumers may have success pursuing claims against the manufacturer, this assumes
that the consumers will be able to overcome lack of privity defenses, which
is by no means a given on claims for pure economic harm. 215 Second, consumers are in a much worse position to argue for a refund or remedy than the
retailer. Retailers buy in bulk from manufacturers, and manufacturers have
an incentive to take back faulty items to keep the large institutional client
happy. 216 Indeed, it may be a part of the contract between the manufacturer
and retailer to do so. While the individual consumer is certainly a concern as
well, the incentives are not the same, and the party in the better position to
bargain is the large retailer. 217 Finally, with regard to the persistent consumer, why should only the most assertive consumers be rewarded? While
this may reflect some degree of importance regarding the underlying claim,
the acquiescence without challenge by some consumers to one-sided terms
may also reflect a lack of education, a different cultural norm, or perhaps just
someone who is more passive by nature. 218 All of this leads to the question
of whether the use of online terms and conditions as in terrorem devices is
ethical, the answer to which appears to be “it depends.”

215. A review of state laws reveals that at least twenty states still require privity of contract
when pure economic harm is at issue. See, e.g., Finch v. Ford Motor Co., 327 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (declining to permit a consumer’s claim for breach of implied warranty against a
manufacturer because no privity of contrast existed between the parties); Rampey v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., 867 So. 2d 1079, 1089 (Ala. 2003) (asserting a lack of contractual privity in the
buyer-manufacturer relationship as the basis for rejecting a buyer’s breach of implied warranties
claim against a manufacturer); see also Harry M. Flechtner, Enforcing Manufacturers’ Warranties,
“Pass Through” Warranties, and the Like: Can the Buyer Get a Refund?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 397,
451–52 (1998) (addressing the position of many courts that have refused to allow consumers to
obtain a refund from third-party manufactures due to the absence of privity between the contracting
parties); Gregory J. Krabacher, Note, Revocation of Tripartite Rolling Contracts: Finding a Remedy
in the Twenty-First Century Usage of Trade, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 397, 397 (2005) (asserting that consumers may lose their right to revoke a contract against a manufacturer when the disclaiming retailer
breaks the privity chain). For further discussion on state law and privity requirements, see supra
note 7.
216. See Leon E. Trakman, The Boundaries of Contract Law in Cyberspace, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J.
187, 199 (2008) (implying that retailers are in a better position to bargain with manufacturers than
online consumers, who typically “lack the resources, know-how, and confidence to stand off against
large-scale producers”).
217. See id.; see also Korobkin, supra note 22, at 1284 (articulating the law-and-economics
theory that “efficient allocations usually assign risks to the party best able to avoid a potential loss
or able to avoid the loss most cheaply, in order to provide the maximum incentive for that party to
take the necessary precautions”).
218. See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule
of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 381 (2008) (theorizing that “less
educated, lower skilled and lower paid subjects with greater employment dependency are more
likely to feel bound by the terms of form-adhesive agreements that restrict their resort to law than
more educated, higher skilled, and higher paid subjects with less employment dependency”).
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The use of online terms and conditions is not per se unethical. Online
sellers are trying to draft terms that can be applicable to a wide array of consumers and in varying circumstances. Many of the more typical terms, such
as warranty disclaimers and liability limitations, are permitted under the
U.C.C. However, when a company representative speaks to a consumer over
the phone, it is unlikely that the customer has read the company’s terms and
conditions. In the case where the consumer did take the time to read the terms
and conditions, the potential enforceability of the terms would be more likely
because of the customer’s knowing assent. But, the fact that sellers who use
browsewrap know how unlikely it is that the terms are adequately brought to
their consumers’ attention is problematic from a business ethics perspective. 219 These sellers have made a conscious effort to use a less noticeable
form of “wrap” agreement in exchange for increasing the likelihood of a
sale. 220 It is, therefore, unethical to use browsewrap in order to gain the benefits and then try to avoid the consequences of that decision by asserting
rights that the sellers know are likely unenforceable against the consumer. 221
Though online sellers may argue that these terms are often unread even when
properly noticed, 222 this argument misses the mark because basic tenets of
contract law require that the other party be given a reasonable opportunity to
read the terms. 223
219. See Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 102 (2011) (detailing the moralists’ perspective on retailers’ use of
standardized terms, which condemns the exploitation of a party’s lack of knowledge of material
information and “would require disclosure as a matter of right and wrong”); cf. Wilkinson-Ryan,
supra note 166, at 164 (noting the mismatch between consumer contracting and contract doctrine,
and commenting that “[t]he problem is that the terms, afforded so little attention ex ante, have too
much weight ex post”).
220. See Kim, supra note 65, at 1342 (emphasizing the growth of companies’ exploitative power
that accompanied “judicial validation of the clickwrap and browsewrap forms,” as “companies further expanded the reach of their contract clauses” and “began to use contracts to extract from consumers additional benefits that were unrelated to the transaction”); see also Schmitz, supra note 63,
at 870 (relaying the fear that powerful companies utilize adhesion contracts “to harness their monopoly power and impose unfair or one-sided terms on consumers”).
221. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 107 (1993) (discussing the duty to disclose information when the other party reasonably has no knowledge of the
information); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 112 (7th ed. 2007)
(“[C]osts are avoided by the imposition on the seller of a duty to disclose information that he obtained costlessly.”).
222. Cf. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545, 547 (2014) (“[E]vidence suggests that consumers seldom read Internet contracts, which contain many controversial provisions.”); Id. at 547–48 (“In one study tracking the
Internet browsing behavior of 45,091 households on sixty-six online software sites, . . . ‘only one
or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers chooses to access the license agreement, and
those few that do spend too little time, on average, to have read more than a small portion of the
license text.’” (citing Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and
Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 1 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Ctr. for Law, Econ. &
Org., Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256)).
223. See Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 219, at 105.
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Online sellers are unlikely, however, to cease using browsewrap as the
primary means of communicating the desired terms. In addition to being
beneficial from a sales perspective, online sellers also have little incentive to
change their behavior when competitors are engaged in the same behavior
without penalty. In this sense, the current state of affairs resembles a sporting
event where performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”) are unregulated. Competing athletes in such an environment, even if morally and ethically opposed
to PEDs, will feel pressured to use them or risk losing to other athletes that
are taking advantage of the unregulated environment. 224 The online sellers,
like the athletes, will not want to use another, more conspicuous form of wrap
agreement when their competitors are using the less conspicuous browsewrap
with possibly the same or more onerous terms. In such an environment, only
two things will likely change online sellers’ behavior: public outrage or regulation mandating minimum standards of disclosure. 225
V. CONCLUSION
Online sellers have at their disposal a variety of methods to make buyers
aware of the terms and conditions that purportedly are binding upon them.
Though clickwrap and scrollwrap are the most effective at notifying buyers
of the existence of terms (even if they remain unread), most sellers still
choose the less effective type—browsewrap. Sellers undoubtedly know that
they have chosen the least conspicuous form of wrap agreement, but the
choice is a rational one meant to maximize sales by streamlining the online
buying experience. But even where the buyer is made aware of the terms,
many may be unenforceable depending on the surrounding circumstances.

224. Kenneth M. Plotz, Athlete Drug Testing: Coming to a Race Near You, COLO. LAW., Jan.
2017, at 19 (“The reality is that some participants will do more than just train hard for the next
competition: they will try to boost performance by using banned substances. Such shortcuts can be
tempting, especially when athletes suspect others are getting away with them.”).
225. See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Wolves of the World Wide Web: Reforming
Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431, 1436, 1502-04 (2014)
(arguing for EU-style regulations with a “blacklist” of prohibited terms and a “graylist” of terms
that are presumed to be unfair to address concerns over the terms of use on social media sites);
Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of Use for a
Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1143–45 (2012) (arguing that U.S.
companies need to reform their terms of use to meet EU standards). Though public outrage can be
used to combat perceived abuses, even where the public has organized to garner a response from
corporations, the effect may be limited, short reaching, and merely designed to stave off regulation.
See, e.g., Josh Constine, Facebook Rewrites Terms of Service, Clarifying Device Data Collection,
TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 4, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/04/facebook-terms-of-service/ (discussing Facebook’s rewrite of its terms of use policies in light of backlash to its data collection
procedures and noting that “[a]s Facebook deals with a disgruntled public and awoken regulatory
bodies, the rewriting of these policies might be perceived as the company trying to cover itself after
neglecting to detail how it pulls and uses people’s data. . . . But today’s revamp could also give
Facebook stronger documents to point to as it tries to prove it doesn’t need heavy-handed government regulation.”).
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Personal injury claims will likely avoid limitations imposed contractually.
But even in claims involving pure economic harm, claims of unconscionability may be persuasive, particularly if the terms are not conspicuous, and the
Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act may also provide relief.
The obstacles to enforcement of the online terms do not seem to bother
online sellers as evidenced by the failure to attempt to include such terms in
live, brick-and-mortar sales. This indicates that the primary motivation for
including online terms as part of the sale is not that the sellers expect them to
be enforceable if challenged, particularly with browsewrap agreements, but
more as an in terrorem device. Online sellers can point to these terms and
conditions to dissuade consumers from pursuing claims or to offer to “settle”
the matter by appearing to give in under the guise of being a “commendable”
seller, thus using the unenforceable terms to actually enhance their reputation. Though the terms themselves may have varying levels of effectiveness
if properly noticed, the fact that, under some circumstances, the terms may
not be enforceable is not per se unethical, but the use of browsewrap does
raise ethical and moral concerns. Online sellers that use browsewrap to purposely deemphasize their terms, but then point to them later as if they are
enforceable, seek to take advantage of their own buyers’ ignorance. While it
may be argued that online buyers are unlikely to read such terms anyway, it
is one thing to provide terms that are unread, but it is a very different thing
to never provide notice of the terms in the first place and deny buyers a reasonable opportunity to review the terms. Unfortunately, market forces will
likely continue to pressure sellers to use less noticeable forms of wrap agreements unless and until online sellers are forced, likely through some form of
regulation, into changing their behavior.

